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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
Consider a director of a building company, who hears at a private party 
about a development site that will soon be available for sale. It is an 
opportunity that the building company might have exploited. Instead, the 
director purchases the site through a new company, completely owned by 
himself, and builds his house on it. Has he wrongfully taken an opportunity that 
belonged to the company for his private benefit? Can a self-interested director 
lawfully exclude the company from a transaction it could have exploited? Rules 
and practices regarding the handling of directors’ personal interests in certain 
business opportunities encompass an economic as well as a moral dimension. 
Considering the differences in business ethics and corporate culture, it is no 
surprise that there is a large disparity in these rules and practices in common 
law jurisdictions versus civil law jurisdictions. But convergence may be at play. 
The conflict between directors’ private interests and their obligations towards 
their companies shapes directors’ duties to perform certain actions and refrain 
from others. The shape and practice of such duties appear increasingly similar 
across jurisdictions. 
The resulting balance may still differ from one jurisdiction to another 
depending on the weight accorded to the duty of loyalty of directors. One of the 
most prevalent distinctions exists when comparing the differences in common 
law and civil law tradition. In common law legal cultures, the duty of loyalty 
has a long tradition rooted in the conception of the business corporation. 
Corporations, as legal institutions, have developed in a series of innovations 
from partnership and trust law.2 In these areas, fiduciary duties are key 
elements. As a corollary, the director has been primarily seen as a trustee or 
fiduciary that must display absolute integrity when dealing with the 
beneficiaries’ properties.3 In contrast, in many civil law jurisdictions, the 
director’s fiduciary position has not received similar emphasis. Typically, 
banning a director from deriving a profit as a result from his position on the 
board, whether the benefit came from self-dealing or self-exploitation of a 
corporate opportunity, is not as salient as in common law jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, civil law jurisdictions have regulated self-dealing for a long time 
and have started moving towards protecting corporate opportunities more 
seriously. 
 
2.  See generally RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW (1923); BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
ENGLAND, 1800-1867 (1936). 
3.  See Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44, 51 (HL). 
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There are various strategies for handling ‘corporate opportunities’. A 
corporate opportunity includes any option to make investments or use 
information or property to potentially benefit the company. There is more than 
one model to look to for inspiration. Scholars have increasingly discussed both 
the US and the UK model in recent years.4 The two approaches are strikingly 
different despite both countries’ common law heritage. The US and the UK 
models have different starting points. While the UK model focuses on avoiding 
conflicts of interest, the US approach starts with identifying the correct owner 
of the opportunity. 
The development of the doctrinal and judicial conversation on business 
opportunity displays an interesting geography and chronology. There are many 
ways to define what counts as a corporate opportunity. 5 In the UK, since 
Aberdeen6, a large number of cases have shaped the no-conflict and no-profit 
principles. Legal scholars have documented the gap between the approach 
implied by these principals and the corporate opportunities doctrine and have 
discussed the attraction of the latter approach.7 Although one might think that 
such considerations would be a basic necessity in the legal dialog, it is 
interesting to note that it was not until late 2011 that French courts first 
recognized that a director may not appropriate a corporate opportunity.8  
A demand for a change in the law often occurs when existing mechanisms 
fail to provide effective governance or fail to respond to changes in the 
economic or political sphere.9 There is currently an identifiable demand for the 
regulation of conflict of interests and for more ethical business practices. This 
is particularly true in countries like France, where trust in institutions has been 
 
4.  See, e.g., Marco Claudio Corradi, Corporate Opportunities Doctrines Tested in the Light of the 
Theory of the Firm – a European (and US) Comparative Perspective, EUR. BUS. L. REV. 755 (2016); 
Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical 
Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as a Case Study, 
UCLA LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 17-01, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894577; David 
Kershaw, Opportunities and Connected Assets, forthcoming in THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming 2018). 
5.  For the canonical treatment, see Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at 
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1006–22 (1981), (discussing various tests employed by 
the courts to define what constitutes corporate opportunities). 
6.  Aberdeen Rly Co. v. Blaikie Bros, [1854] 1 Macq. Ap. 461 (HL). 
7.  See, e.g., David Kershaw, Lost in Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative 
Perspective, 25 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 603, 607–08 (2005); Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience 
– A Justification of a Stringent Profit-stripping Rule, 28 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 763 (2008). 
8.  See Genevieve Helleringer, Le dirigeant à l’épreuve des opportunité d’affaires, 24 RECUEIL 
DALLOZ 2 (2012). Corporate opportunities issues could in theory be framed under certain circumstances 
as unfair competition cases: this was however seldom the case and there was hardly any legal 
consequence for managers. 
9.  Such demand also increases with the development of transactions for which non-legal 
mechanisms of governance were once adequate. 
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shattered by various factors.10 At the same time, there has been a development 
of the corporate opportunities doctrine in recent years. For this reason, a 
comparative perspective on this topic is timely.11 Furthermore, there is no 
jurisdiction in which the corporate opportunity regulation has reached an 
acceptable equilibrium. Its nature and function (deterrence, prevention or 
primary attribution rule) are still being discussed across jurisdictions.12 The 
core thesis of this paper shows that there is a considerable degree of 
convergence in the corporate opportunity doctrine, which has radiated from the 
US to Germany and France. The UK – as a jurisdiction of origin itself – has 
largely retained its own, separate tradition. However, the convergence may 
remain incomplete: similar rules may have different consequences. 
This paper surveys the corporate opportunities doctrine in four 
jurisdictions: the US, the UK, Germany, and France. Our analysis enables us to 
trace the development of the doctrine, exposing the way in which certain 
models of dealing with a particular issue have arisen, and how these models 
have then spread. This allows us to contribute to the debate on global 
convergence in corporate governance. We can distinguish two “ancestral” 
models, namely the UK and US ones, which are both rooted in the common law 
model of fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Regarding the regulation of 
corporate opportunities, the UK model developed from the mid-19th century a 
strict conception based on the figure of the fiduciary and characterized by the 
no-conflict/no-profit rules. The UK legislature codified the rules in 2006 and a 
procedure of ex ante authorization by the board of directors was introduced for 
the first time. In the end, however, the traditional concepts remain entrenched. 
The stable and strict expectations of directors distinguish the doctrine in the UK 
from the doctrine in the US. 
The U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine has developed through case law. 
After a period of expansion over the course of the 20th century, the doctrine has 
culminated in a broad conception of fairness, as shown by the most recent 
important case.13 In practice, this has led to attempts to opt out of the corporate 
opportunities doctrine, either ex post – by submitting the question to the board 
– or ex ante – by attempting to eliminate corporate opportunities in the 
corporate charter, or by specifying what opportunities belong to the 
 
10.  See the survey of distrust towards institutions in France and how it compares to scores in 
Eastern European countries: YANN ALGAN & PIERRE CAHUC, LA SOCIÉTÉ DE DÈFIANCE: COMMENT LE 
MODÈLE SOCIAL FRANÇAIS S’AUTODÉTRUIT? Rue d’Ulm Publisher, 2007; see also the letter written by 
the CEOs of the main accounting firms in France and published in the French newspaper Le Monde. Ce 
que l’économie demande aujourd’hui à la profession réglementée du chiffre, LE MONDE, Mar. 21, 2016; 
L’évolution de la comptabilité des entreprises à l’aune de celle des Etats, LE MONDE, Oct. 9, 2015 
(stressing the higher standard of accountability now in place). 
11.  See Kershaw, supra note 9. 
12.  See Lionel Smith, Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations, 7 J. 
EQUITY 1 (2013). 
13.  Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). 
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corporation. Since corporate opportunities are of particular relevance in closely 
held firms, this can be seen as a part of the larger trend to contractualize 
fiduciary duty, which is particularly evident in limited liability companies. We 
hypothesize that fiduciary duties may have reached a stage of retrenchment in 
their life cycle. Given that open-ended standards seem to have an inherent 
tendency to expand, eventually, a backlash may develop. 
For the comparative analysis, however, we make the observation that the 
U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine has been the inspiration for the gradual 
adoption of the doctrine in Germany and France. In particular, in Germany, the 
law historically prohibited officers of the corporation from engaging in 
competing business activities. The statutory prohibition applied to some, but 
not all, corporate opportunities and also left open some space for the corporate 
opportunities doctrine to move into. It owes its adoption to a number of 
academics who studied the U.S. corporate opportunities doctrine and re-
interpreted a number of cases involving officers who violated their duties to 
their corporations. Through the confluence of judicial and academic 
developments, the US model of the corporate opportunities doctrine became 
entrenched in German law.  
French law, which has until very recently hesitated to say that directors owe 
a duty of loyalty, has moved in a similar direction. Though the exploitation of 
corporate opportunities is still hardly regulated in France and cases only deal 
with gérants (managers) of small, privately held limited companies, the rules 
that encompass the idea of preventing competition to the company’s activities 
are emerging. The reference to the company’s line of business signals an 
affinity with the US approach and a divide with the UK conception. 
Overall, we can identify an export of the US model, possibly signaling 
some convergence in corporate law. The convergence debate in corporate 
governance revolves around to what extent corporate law and corporate 
governance practices have become more similar over the years, and whether 
corporate law and corporate governance have been trending towards a 
shareholder-oriented model. Our paper enables us to tackle a number of 
questions. First, how can convergence take place on the micro-level of specific 
legal doctrines? Second, why are systems converging to a particular model 
(here, apparently the US one)? And third, is convergence complete or 
incomplete? In a well-known paper, Gilson distinguished between formal and 
functional convergence.14 Our analysis suggests a complex picture. We can see 
relatively complete formal convergence in Germany toward the US model, but 
only a limited level of it in France, where the doctrine has largely been 
absorbed sub rosa. 
 
14.  Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). 
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This article proceeds as follows. Part II sets up the question we are trying to 
answer in this paper: are jurisdictions converging to a single model of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine? To that end, we look at the meaning of 
convergence, the process, and both of its formal and functional content. We 
therefore have to explore the economic role of the corporate opportunities 
doctrine within the framework of agreements underlying a specific corporation, 
as well as the larger environment in which corporations operate. We also have 
to confront the question of legal transplants: when a rule or legal principle 
transplants from one system to the other, how will the host system react? Part 
III begins the comparative investigation by looking at the two “origin” 
countries that developed the corporate opportunity doctrine by themselves, 
namely the UK and the US. As we show, the doctrine in those two jurisdictions 
shares some common features, but ultimately, they rest on very different 
principles. Part IV provides two case studies in legal transplantation: while the 
corporate opportunities doctrine is of common law origin, both Germany and 
France have adopted it in recent years. As we show, both countries have 
adopted a model that resembles the US model more closely than the UK model. 
Part V attempts to explain the success of the US model compared to the UK 
model by framing the debate within the context of convergence in corporate 
governance. Part VI discusses the implication for legal theory, specifically the 
convergence debate in corporate governance and the transplant debate in 
comparative law. Part VII summarizes and concludes our findings. 
PART II: LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AS A VEHICLE FOR CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The concept of business opportunities and the necessity to subject them to 
some kind of judicial scrutiny is more recent in Germany and in France than in 
the UK and in the US, where the doctrines’ outlines started to take shape in the 
late 19th century. This raises several questions: 1) why in both common law and 
civil law jurisdictions, corporate law doctrines often come to resemble each 
other over time, and 2) how deep this resemblance actually is.15 Additionally, 
this development triggers the question of whether the law protecting corporate 
opportunities is converging. In this part, we survey the phenomenon of 
convergence in corporate governance and situate the doctrinal concept of 
corporate opportunities as a legal transplant within this debate. Subsection A 
discusses convergence in corporate governance generally and distinguishes 
between formal and functional convergence. Subsection B argues that the 
corporate opportunity doctrine constitutes a legal transplant as understood by 
the comparative law literature. To better understand the role such a legal 
 
15.  See generally David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL 
CULTURES 7, 22 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001). 
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transplant can take up in the host jurisdiction, subsection C investigates the 
economic functions of corporate opportunities, particularly from the standpoint 
of incomplete contacts theory. 
A. Convergence in corporate governance – phenomenon or phantom? 
The convergence debate in corporate governance typically attempts to 
describe a development that reached its highest point during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. In short, in the view of the convergence theory, a corporate 
governance model focused on the interest of shareholders, in particular outside 
investors, radiated from the U.S. and the U.K., began to influence both the 
corporate governance practices and the corporate laws of countries where 
previously, other interests dominated. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the rise of 
the “corporate governance movement” around Europe resulted in the enactment 
of corporate governance codes based on the British “comply or explain” 
model.16 Corporate law reforms of this period, such as the German Control and 
Transparency Act of 1998,17 the French “Nouvelles régulations économiques” 
of 200118, and the Italian reforms of 2004, were ostensibly intended to appeal 
to the interests of shareholders.19 Both the EU’s “High-Level Report of 
 
16.  Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance, 17 CORP. GOV. 376, 
377–79 (2009) (describing the spread of codes from their English origins). The ECGI provides a list at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php. Since a 2006 amendment, art. 46a of the Fourth EC Company 
Law Directive (the “Accounting Directive”) requires that publicly traded firms must disclose whether 
the company applies a corporate governance code, and explain if it does not apply some of its 
provisions. The significance of these codes in Continental Europe is questionable, given that there is 
little, if any empirical evidence showing positive effects. For alternative interpretations, see Steen 
Thomsen, The Hidden Meaning of Codes: Corporate Governance and Investor Rent Seeking, 7 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 845 (2006), for interpreting codes as a rent-seeking mechanism for institutional 
investors; Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law as Marketing Gimmick – The Case of the German Corporate 
Governance Code, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 115, 132–33 (2004) (plausibly describing the 
German code as a marketing instrument aimed at foreign investors); Alessandro Zattoni & Francesca 
Cuomo, Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of Institutional and Efficiency 
Perspectives, 16 CORP. GOV. 1, 13 (2008) (suggesting that the content and adoption process of codes 
supports both an “efficiency theory” and a “legitimation theory” for the adoption of codes in civil law 
countries); MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 56–59 (2008). 
17.  Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [KonTraG] [Law on Control 
and Transparency in Business], Mar. 3, 1998, BGBL I at 786, no. 24 (Ger.); see, e.g., Mariana 
Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2952 (2012) 
(discussing the role of the KonTraG and privatization for the development of shareholder value thinking 
in Germany); PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY 192 (2008). 
However, the ostensible motivation of this comprehensive legal reform were actually a number of 
corporate failures in the late 1990s. For an overview of the act, see Ulrich Seibert, Control and 
Transparency in Business (KonTraG): Corporate Governance Reform in Germany, 1999 EUR. BUS. L. 
REV. 70, 70 (describing the collapse of Metallgesellschaft as a main trigger for the debate). 
18.  Ben Clift, French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of Change 
and Hybridisation within Models of Capitalism, 55 POL. STUD. 546, 553–57 (2007). 
19.  See also Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 127–37 (2007) (surveying Continental European reforms). 
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Company Law Experts” of 200220 and the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive 
followed a shareholder agenda.21 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s provocative 2001 article 
constitutes the most known academic contribution to the convergence debate. 
They identify not only the forces of logic and the example of the successful 
model of the Anglo-Saxon countries22 (the appeal of which has to some extent 
faded since the financial crisis), but they also argue that larger macroeconomic 
trends, such as greater openness toward competition and the wider diffusion of 
equity ownership, play a role in this purported trend.23 Related changes, such as 
those in the structure of retirement systems, may have also played a role.24 
Additionally, the international expansion of institutional investors clearly 
contributed to this trend, e.g. CalPERS, which began to promote a set of 
“Global Corporate Governance Principles” in the 1990s.25 In their view, the 
history of corporate law and governance had come to an end, with the 
shareholder-oriented achieving dominance.26 
Other authors contributing to the early convergence literature contested 
strong convergence claims and emphasized institutional hurdles impeding 
changes. For example, Curtis Milhaupt argued that there could not be an 
optimal convergence in corporate governance because what is optimal will 
depend on the system.27 In the same vein, Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe 
stressed that path dependence is bound to prevail over the pressure of global 
competition for convergence. As a consequence, diversity will dominate in the 
 
20.  E.g., Jaap Winter, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, at 47 (November 4, 2002) (“In a proper 
system of corporate governance, shareholders should have effective means to actively exercise influence 
over the company.”). 
21.  Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 106) 17 (EC) (on the exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies) (implementing e.g. a record date system and facilitating voting for 
international investors). 
22.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 
439, 449–50 (2001). 
23.  Id. at 450–53. 
24.  See PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL 220–21 (2005) for a suggestion of a shift in the political preferences of workers toward 
minority shareholder protection; Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder 
Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 967–68 (2013); see also Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66–70 (2009) for a discussion of the retirement savings 
of workers as reason for the political importance of shareholders; Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the 
Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2011). 
25.  Thomas J. André, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate 
Governance Ideology to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 76–83 (1998) (describing CalPERS’ portfolio 
and its code of principles). 
26.  The authors also recognize that differences may persist among countries but they do not 
explain how the persistence of such differences does not weaken their general claim. 
27.  Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VAND. L. REV. 1145, 1189–90 (1998). 
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short and medium term.28 More precisely, Roe argued that corporate 
governance institutions are largely idiosyncratic in each country since they are 
formed by historical and political factors that differ from one country to 
another. This sets boundaries to possible developments of corporate governance 
towards the most efficient solutions. Choices made by firms and states carry a 
stronger influence:29 Even in the face of market pressures to adjust to a more 
economically efficient corporate governance system, a pre-selected path 
resulting from historical and political origins may prevent corporate 
governance from adjusting to contemporaneous challenges. In practical terms, 
past institutional changes have created interest groups of stakeholders who 
enjoy an advantage under the system as it has developed.30 This situation 
creates high adaptation costs that are likely to impede reforms that do not 
advance the interests of these groups and perpetuate existing power structures 
and institutional choices. Moreover, some systems may not be well-positioned 
to follow a particular development that is difficult to integrate into the existing 
doctrinal framework. Our case in point, corporate opportunities, is a typical 
example that relates to the question of conflicts of interest, an issue to which 
not all legal cultures have been equally sensitive.  Traditionally, in French 
corporate law debates, there has been little concern about conflict of interest 
issues within firms, besides the question of insider trading and minority 
shareholder oppression. Directors’ liabilities are traditionally subsumed into the 
board’s. The duties individually imposed upon directors have only been 
discovered in recent cases.31 As a result, French corporate law is not well-
prepared to address the corporate opportunity problem. 
Another major irritant in the original convergence literature is the 
monolithic view of superior Anglo-Saxon governance that is sometimes 
assumed, which tends to overemphasize the similarities while overlooking the 
differences between the U.S. and the U.K. and between jurisdictions in 
Continental Europe. In several areas, the U.S. and the U.K. stand at polar ends 
of the regulatory spectrum, e.g. in terms of the shareholder-manager balance of 
 
28.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance 
and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169 (1999). 
29.  Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 646–52 
(1996); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS - WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 47, 245–80 (1994); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating 
Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 580–84 (2000); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151–52 (2003). 
30.  Typically, a group of stakeholders may enjoy private rents or have made firm-specific 
investments that would be devalued if there were radical institutional changes. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 912 (2005). 
31.  See Cour de cassation [Cass], Mar. 30, 2010, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 
377, note  Dondero & Le Cannu, JURISCLASSEUR ENTREPRISE 2010.II.1416 A Couret (Fr.). 
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powers and in the board’s duties when facing a hostile takeover.32 In the area of 
corporate opportunities, the difference is subtler but still significant. As we will 
discuss below, France and Germany adopted the corporate opportunities 
doctrine mainly from the U.S., although with considerable differences. 
The fact that corporate law converges in form does not mean it also 
converges in function, and vice versa. The distinction between ‘convergence of 
form’ and ‘convergence of substance’ (or ‘of function’) was first introduced by 
Gilson.33 Convergence is only functional (but not formal) when governance 
institutions are flexible enough to embrace changed circumstances while 
keeping their formal characteristics. This would be the case if a jurisdiction 
does not adopt rules that explicitly address corporate opportunities, but relies 
on its own mechanisms (e.g. a formal prohibition for directors to compete with 
the firm) to tackle what is locally a new issue. New circumstances may 
sometimes lead to a change in the structure of the governance institutions. Such 
institutional alterations signal formal convergence.34 For example, this would 
be the case if a jurisdiction abandoned its previous doctrinal approach to the 
corporate opportunities problem and adopted the line of reasoning and 
vocabulary established under U.S. law.35 Finally, it is possible for convergence 
to be merely formal, but not functional. This can happen when a jurisdiction 
adopts a statute from abroad, but enforces it adequately idiosyncratically, e.g., 
uses it to tackle factual situations different from the jurisdiction of origin. On 
its face, corporate law might then seem to have converged, even if effectively it 
has not. 
B. Convergence through legal transplants 
Although the convergence literature does not often intersect with the 
concept of legal transplants in the comparative law literature, legal transplants 
can be vehicles of convergence in corporate governance. The adoption of a 
corporate opportunity concept across very different jurisdictions can lead to 
convergence of rules. 
As we will see in Parts III and IV when discussing the four jurisdictions 
presented, there are discussions of U.K. and U.S. law in the doctrinal literature 
in France and Germany. Additionally, the vocabulary used by courts in these 
 
32.  E.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 603–11 (2010). 
33.  Gilson, supra note 16, at 329–57. 
34.  If the political context does not allow for legislative action, modifications may be embedded in 
contract and provide for contractual convergence. 
35.  The formal legal order of many countries was borrowed, voluntarily or not, from a small group 
of origin countries, including France, Germany, the US and the UK. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina 
Pistor & Jean-François Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165, 171, 176–79 (2003) for a table summarizing transplants’ origins in terms of legal 
family. 
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jurisdictions mirrors the Anglo-American terminology. France and Germany, in 
their limited adoption of the corporate opportunity law, have followed the 
pattern set abroad. The adoption takes the form of a “transplant”, 36 which can 
be defined as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to 
another, or from one person to another.”37 This dynamic differs from both the 
automatic global convergence of socio-economic structures advocated by 
Hansmann and Kraakman38 and the institutional dynamic identified by 
Milhaupt and others.  
In order to understand the implications of the legal transplant hypothesis, a 
brief account of the scholarly debate on this topic is necessary. This account 
will illustrate the case for the possibility of a transplant and explain how the 
transplant took place and what its potential effects are. As explained later, a 
crucial factor of legal transplants is their ability to adjust to the local legal 
culture of their host jurisdiction. 
The transplant of a legal solution gives the importing jurisdiction a model. 
It therefore enables it to quickly deal with the concerned issue as compared 
with the time that the exporting jurisdiction required to refine a balanced 
solution. While the existence of transplants is a historical fact,39 conditions of 
their reception and their actual practical impact have been controversial.40 
According to Alan Watson’s account,41 jurisdictions often borrow laws from 
 
36.  The medical metaphor has been used since the 1970s. Sometimes attributed to Watson, who 
theorized the notion (see below), its use is anterior. See John W. Cairns, Development of Comparative 
Law in Great Britain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 131, 146, 150, 170–71 
(Mathias Reimann, & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). More importantly, the term appears in various 
papers at the about the same time and in different places (e.g. in France, as from 1972 Rivero discusses 
how the utility of such metaphor drawn from advanced surgery, in Jean Rivero, Les phénomènes 
d’imitation des modèles étrangers en droit administratif, in 2 PAGES DE DOCTRINE 459, 459 (Andre 
Laubadère, André Mathiot & Jean Rivero eds., 1980). 
37.  ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1974). 
38.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. 
J. 439, 449–50 (2001). 
39.  For an account of legal transplants in German company law; see, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Legal 
Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht Aufsatz, , 2004 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
1129. For a French perspective across various legal areas, see generally FRANCOIS TERRE, 
L’AMÉRICANISATION DU DROIT 7-267 (2001). See also Holger Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European 
Company Law – The Case of Fiduciary Duties, 2 EUR. CO. FIN. L. REV. 378 (2006). 
40.  Savigny strongly advocated that the law of any country grows up naturally by customary usage 
and without legislation. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FÜR 
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814). This view slowed down the adoption of a civil 
Code in Germany that turned out to heavily draw on Roman law. Regarding Savigny’s views, see, e.g., 
Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law 
and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 343–44 (2008) 
(discussing Savigny’s view that law evolved historically and his opposition to codification). 
41.  See id. at 639. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(1974) 21; ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY (1984); see also Alan 
Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 313–14 (1978); Alan Watson, 
Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1983). For a 
literature review, see John Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 637, 672 (2013). For an account of history and current debate. 
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elsewhere that, even if they were strongly rooted in the local history,42 are able 
to operate in very different places. As the laws integrate into a specific ‘legal 
culture’,43 the way law is generally applied, obeyed and practiced in the 
receiving jurisdiction will necessarily affect the practical impact of the 
transplanted law. However, transplants will also affect the legal culture they 
integrate.44 We can expect a significant impact on legal reasoning, particularly 
when the transplant bridges different legal traditions, such as the common law 
and the civil law. A transplant shaped in a concrete and practical tradition, 
possibly receptive to an economic analysis of law, will potentially introduce its 
host jurisdiction to a new type of reasoning, in contrast to its traditionally 
abstract and category-based analyses.45 To capture the evolutionary dynamic 
triggered by this phenomenon, scholars have coined competing sets of 
vocabulary, in particular, “legal irritants”46 and “legal formants”,47 which 
capture the social, economic, political and doctrinal dimensions put into motion 
by transplants.48 
The radical critique of transplants49 is not corroborated by empirical 
observation. 50 Eastern Europe’s borrowing of legal codes from Western 
powers after the fall of the Berlin Wall illustrates the reality of at least one 
 
42.  The main examples Watson uses for his demonstration are taken from the reception of Roman 
law in Western Europe. Roman rules were included in Germanic legal compilations, and these 
compilations themselves tended to be adopted and adapted cross-nationally for centuries throughout 
Western Europe. According to the Watsonian approach, “the interconnection between law and society is 
not so close as to preclude borrowing from alien systems. Reception is both possible and explicable so 
long as one recognizes that the most important group for reception of legal rules is the legal elite.” 
Michael H. Hoeflich, Law, Society and Reception: The Vision of Alan Watson, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1083, 
1088–89 (1987). For a (sympathetic) account of Watson’s theory, see also Gunther Teubner, Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MODERN L. 
REV. 11, 14–15 (1998). 
43.  “Legal culture” is understood here as law as culture. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 15, 193–94 (1975); VOLKMAR GESSNER, ARMIN 
HOELAND & CSABA VARGA, EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 3–5 (1996); Martin Hesselink, The New 
European Culture – Ten Years On, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 17–24 (Geneviève 
Helleringer & Kai Purhagen eds., 2014). It must be noted that Watson also draws on ideas of culture, but 
understood as the culture of the lawyers, whereas our conception is broader and corresponds to the usual 
understanding of the expression. 
44.  Mathias Reimann, Droit positif et culture juridique. L’américanisation du droit européen par 
réception, ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 45, 61, 63–64 (2001). 
45.  Reimann, supra note 46, at 70. 
46.  Teubner, supra note 44, at 12. 
47.  Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 1 (1991). 
48.  Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974). 
49.  Legrand draws on epistemological premises and anthropological theory to argue that law 
simply cannot be separated from its context as it only exists as interpreted and applied within an 
interpretative community. Law only has a meaning in context; change the context and the law changes. 
Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); 
see also Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55 (David Nelken 
& Johannes Feest eds., 2001). 
50.  See Teubner, supra note 44, at 15. 
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example of transplant.”51 The critique effectively touches more upon the effect 
of transplants and their successes rather than their existences. 
Over the last forty years, this short account of the academic debate on legal 
transplants clarifies an important idea for our own inquiry. A legal transplant 
cannot be expected to engineer a solution fully compatible with the host 
jurisdiction. It should be expected to take on a life of its own in its new host, in 
the form of a legal irritant interacting with the local legal culture. Hence, the 
fact that French or German solutions do not exactly follow an identified model 
does not mean that they cannot result from an importation. On the contrary, 
adaptation provides evidence for successful importation, as the debate on 
transplant strategy shows.  
C. The corporate opportunities doctrine as a legal transplant  
1) The law of corporate opportunities, its function, and its interaction with 
national production structures 
From an economic standpoint, the protection of corporate opportunities 
interplays with the structure of both finance and production. It therefore carries 
a different importance in jurisdictions that have different financial and 
production structures, which may be counterproductive in certain contexts. 
Corporate law is typically analyzed within the framework of agency theory and 
incomplete contracts.52  Agency costs are the economic translation of conflict 
of interests.53 Fiduciary duties are protections granted to the shareholders in 
compensation for the deficit of explicit promises in the corporate contract.54 
Within the agency theory framework, shareholders invest in a corporation for 
the purpose of achieving a certain goal, typically understood as the 
maximization of long-term profitability. Directors and officers of the 
corporation, however, will rationally pursue their own goals and engage in 
opportunistic behavior, specifically by activities that draw resources from the 
corporation. These opportunities frequently come up due to information 
 
51.  See, e.g., Steven J. Heim, Predicting Legal Transplants: The Case of Servitudes in the Russian 
Federation, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 203 (1996) (explaining why post-collapse of 
the Russian Federation is an appropriate time to study legal transplants). The intense debate about the 
harmonization or unification of European Private Law also steered the legal transplant conversation. 
Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member States, EUR. PARL., 1989 O.J. 
(C 158) 400; Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors of Private Law of the Member States, 
EUR. PARL., 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518; see also Guido Alpa, European Community Resolutions and the 
Codification of “Private Law,” 8 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 321, 323 (2000). 
52.  For a review of incomplete contracts theory in corporate law, see, for example, Luigi Zingales, 
Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 118–19 (2017). 
53.  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 103 (1991). 
54.  Id. at 90 (“If contracts can be written in enough detail, there is no need for ‘fiduciary’ duties as 
well.”). 
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asymmetries. To keep down the cost of capital, shareholders will rationally 
monitor them, while directors and officers may sometimes be in the position to 
signal their good intention to those who are – in economic terms – considered 
their principals.55 
In this framework, the duty of loyalty (the duty to prioritize the principal’s 
interests over the agent’s own) is a mechanism that either incentivizes 
fiduciaries to reveal information ex ante, for example by creating incentives to 
inform shareholders about potentially opportunistic transactions,56 or deters 
fiduciaries’ opportunistic behavior by imposing penalties in the form of 
damages and/or the disgorgement of ex post profits. However, in the context of 
corporate opportunities, the question is subtler. The duty of loyalty always 
protects the corporation (and its shareholders) relative to a certain baseline. In 
the case of self-dealing transactions, this is a relatively straightforward 
assumption that directors and officers will not siphon any corporate resources 
out of the corporation through transactions they enter into with the company. 
For the corporate opportunities doctrine, the baseline is that they will not, to the 
detriment of the company, appropriate any profitable business opportunities to 
themselves.57 The difficulty here is how to determine ex ante which 
opportunities the corporation has a right of first refusal, meaning that directors 
or officers may only take the opportunity if the corporation forebears this right. 
Following the Coase Theorem, one could imagine the parties bargaining for the 
optimal allocation of corporate opportunities between the corporation and its 
managers.58 In practice, we often do not always observe such bargaining, and 
courts might even make it impossible by considering its own assignment of 
corporate opportunities among the parties mandatory law. Under these 
circumstances, it is plausible for scholars to argue that the courts should aim at 
protecting the legitimate expectations of shareholders.59 To that end, courts first 
 
55.  See generally John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and 
Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 29, 29–30 (Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, 
Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mariana 
Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe & Edward Rock, 3rd ed. 2017). 
56.  One example would be the consequences of approval of transactions either by fully informed 
disinterested directors or by a fully informed majority of the disinterested minority shareholders, in 
which case courts will apply a standard more favorable to the fiduciaries if the transactions is challenged 
in court. 
57.  E.g., Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, 
145, 145. 
58.  Corradi, supra note 6, at 768–69. For the Coase Theorem, see generally R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (original article developing the economic theory); 
David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 270 
(1998); Francesco Parisi, Coase theorem and transaction cost economics in the law, in THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7, 10–28 (Jürgen G. Backhaus ed., 1999) (both explaining the 
significance of the theorem). 
59.  See Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1010–12 (discussing rational expectations of 
shareholders as a test for corporate opportunities in close corporation). 
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have to determine the expectations, which are not obvious in the business 
opportunity context.60 
Absent an explicit contractual stipulation61, a court, facing the question of 
delineating whether an opportunity should be reserved for the corporation, 
might ask what the parties would have agreed on if they had thought about a 
specific business opportunity ex ante and had completed their contractual 
relationship accordingly. The corporate opportunities doctrine could be seen as 
a default assignment of property rights.62 If the corporation, its shareholders 
(and other constituencies potentially benefiting from the opportunity), and its 
directors and officers were able to foresee all possible future states of the 
world, they would agree to assign each opportunity in each possible state to the 
highest value user (which could be either the firm or someone else), thereby 
maximizing the total payoff from exploiting the opportunity.63 This contrast is 
incomplete, since it is not possible for the parties to foresee all eventualities 
that may arise and provide for themselves. Moreover, even ex ante, one party is 
likely to have superior information. This could result in opportunism in the 
negotiation and the preclusion of a mutually beneficial complete contingent 
contract.64 Much of the literature seems to consider it the paramount goal for 
the highest value user (or the lowest cost user) to exploit the opportunity. 
Brudney and Clark, for example, recommend a “higher value” defense even for 
the controlling shareholder of publicly held corporations,65 where they 
normally would consider a strong protection of dispersed outside investors to 
be determinative.66  
The corporate opportunity doctrine fulfills an important function in 
assigning potential business opportunities, both within the corporation and to 
the free-wheeling “morals of the marketplace,” where they are available for the 
taking.67 Since there is no natural default assignment of ownership, this task 
may be difficult. In fact, the delineation developed by the courts may rather 
shape the expectations of the party rather than vice versa. There are competing 
ways to analyze the issue. It might be conceptualized in terms of ownership or 
 
60.  But see our discussion below of incentives for business innovation, which might inform criteria 
applied by the court. Infra section V.A. 
61.  See infra Section III.A.2 (discussing DGCL 122(17)). 
62.  Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate 
Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L. J. 277, 280 (1998). 
63.  Id. at 322–25. 
64.  Id. at 327. 
65.  Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1055–60 (discussing the assignment of corporate 
opportunities between parent and subsidiary firm). 
66.  Id. at 1001–06 (suggesting that a categorical prohibition should generally apply in publicly 
traded firms). 
67.  Unless those potentially “grabbing” the opportunity are subject to further limitations, e.g. a 
contractual or legal duty not to compete, as are e.g. members of the executive board in German stock 
corporations. 
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in terms of loyalty and status of the director. As we shall see, the U.S. and U.K. 
corporate opportunity laws sharply diverge on this. The former follows an 
ownership approach while the latter largely follows a status approach. Both 
approaches formally rely on fiduciary duties, a tool that is flexible enough to 
adjust to the different lines of reasoning.68 
The remedies with which corporate opportunities are protected also play an 
important role. If the remedy is merely a liability to the corporation for the 
injury inflicted on it (a classical liability rule), a fiduciary who is able to exploit 
it at lower cost and higher gain can take it with relatively ease and make a 
profit. This results in an efficient assignment of the opportunity. However, 
opportunities are often protected by gain-based sanctions,69 effectively 
assigning them as property rights (in the sense of the Calabresi-Melamed 
framework70) to the corporation.71 A fiduciary will thus be forced to reveal 
information he possesses about a business opportunity in order to negotiate an 
opt-out.72 If he is indeed the higher value user that wants to take the 
opportunity himself, he may face opportunistic bargaining on behalf of the 
corporation, which could eviscerate the gain and even make it sometimes even 
unfeasible for the opportunity to be exploited at all in a high-transaction cost 
environment.73 On the one hand, weak protection of corporate opportunities, or 
“elasticity” in their legal protection,74 may foster innovation by permitting 
fiduciaries to take innovations with them and employ them for their highest 
value use.75 A widely-cast net in the definition of opportunities and strong 
property rights protection may thus at times reduce innovation and prevent 
desirable market entry ex post when an opportunity arises. Ex ante, fiduciaries 
may also be deterred from seeking out new business opportunities, thus 
reducing the overall vitality of the economy.76 
 
68.  “Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors and managers would 
have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their agreement) at no cost.” EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 92. 
69.  We will explore this below. 
70.  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1989 (1972). 
71.  On the application of the Calabresi-Melamed framework, see Michael J. Whincop, Painting the 
Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law, 19 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 20, 35 
(1999). 
72.  On penalty default rules, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989). 
73.  On high and low transaction cost environments see Kershaw, supra note 9, at 617–18 
74.  Compare in the financial context an account of ‘law’s elasticity,’ i.e., “the probability that ex 
ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future,” Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of 
Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 320 (2013). 
75.  See Corradi, supra note 6, at 776–78 (discussing innovation as “information-specific 
investment”). 
76.  For the comparable case of non-compete clauses, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal 
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to 
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575–629 (1999). 
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2) The reception of the law of corporate opportunities as a legal transplant 
The reception of a legal transplant may be measured by the degree of 
enforcement of the imported rules. This criterion rests on the generally 
accepted view that enforcement and effective legal institutions are important 
for economic development, whereas weak legal institutions are an impediment 
to future growth and development.77 However, the content of the transplant or 
the context of transplantation is debatable. Scholars have granted considerable 
weight to the content of the transplant, i.e. to the substantive law of the 
exporting jurisdiction. “Countries of origin” or “origins” have famously been 
advocated for as key predictors of the quality of a transplant.78 The policy 
implication is that at the time of transplant, choosing the best possible rule will 
enhance economic development. Though differences among legal families of 
origins (Common Law, French, German and Scandinavian families) are widely 
accepted, it remains disputed whether the Common Law, and U.S. law in 
particular, carries a premium.79 In a less controversial manner, for the purpose 
of our study, the implication of this line of research is that the choice for the 
transplant between the U.S. and the U.K. models of corporate governance law 
bears consequences. 
Other researchers have established that the context, i.e., how the legal order 
is transplanted, is more important than the choice of the law of a particular 
legal family.80 For the transplanted law to be effective, it must be meaningful in 
its context of application. Otherwise, citizens have no incentive to use it and 
require effective legal institutions for enforcement. In the longer term, the 
transplanted law must also be amenable to evolutions and improvements, which 
may require the host jurisdiction to embrace the more concrete and 
contextualized reasoning an Anglo-American transplant displays as compared 
to the civil law traditions. In other words, the existing legal infrastructure must 
complement the transplant in order to absorb it in the legal system.81 
 
77.  Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, at 1752–57 (2000); Simon Johnson, Daniel 
Kaufmann & Andrei Shleifer, The Unofficial Economy in Transition, 2 BROOKINGS PAPS. ON ECON. 
ACT. 159, 161 (1997). 
78.  Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael 
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
79.  Compare Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 
430, 462 (2008) (finding that common law countries have more robust anti-self–dealing laws than 
French legal origin countries in particular), with Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock 
Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 462, 495–502 (2006) (suggesting that the less deep stock markets in 
Continental Europe are better explained by economic collapse in the first half of the 20th Century). 
80.  Berkowitz et al., supra note 37, at 174–81. 
81.  Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s 
Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 891 (2003) (discussing “micro-
fit”). 
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The importance granted to the local context in this line of research draws 
attention to the risk of “transplant shocks”. They relate to the possibility that a 
legal rule that works well in one jurisdiction will not have the same effect or 
even be rejected in another jurisdiction where the historical, political, or 
cultural background is different.82 As to corporate opportunities, there are some 
empirical evidence that psychology of the actors might be a key component of 
the efficacy of the rule. Stout has suggested that, among the elements of local 
context for transplant shocks, one is “local inclination toward other-regarding 
behavior.”83 Stout focuses on the rules of fiduciary duty. She demonstrates that 
in practice these rules are open-ended standards that are only imperfectly and 
incompletely enforced by legal sanctions.84 U.S. corporate insiders nevertheless 
exhibit a relatively high degree of compliance with fiduciary duty rules.85 
According to Stout, “we do not yet fully understand the sources of such 
differences, some of the more obvious possibilities include nature (genetics), 
nurture (learning), and present social context (culture, i.e., of the needs, 
expectations, identities, and likely behavior of those around us). The source that 
is most significant matters, because depending of the source and determinants 
of altruism, the task of successfully exporting U.S. corporate law may range 
from merely difficult to impossible.”86 By itself, the adoption of formal rules of 
law that resemble U.S. corporate law may not produce results similar to those 
observed in U.S. corporations. In order to make sense of transplants, it will be 
useful to assess the local context from a socio-economic perspective. 
Gilson has suggested that corporate governance system sometimes 
converge in function when they do not converge in form: If a particular 
solution is not available in the legal system, or a particular encumbrance 
resulting from the local system is present, legal actors might find another 
workaround to reach the same functional outcome.87 The transplant effect – 
resulting from different economic structures or otherwise – may then result in 
the opposite situation: While a legal system has maybe superficially absorbed 
the corporate opportunities doctrine, legal actors might apply it in a mitigated 
way because its effects would be too disruptive. Consequently, we would see 
convergence in form, but not in function. 
 
82.  Berkowitz et al., supra note 37, at 167; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The 
Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2098–99 
(2001); see also Kanda & Milhaupt, id., at 891 (discussing a transplanted rule’s “macro-fit”, meaning 
how well it fits into the political economy of the host country). 
83.  Lynn Stout, On The Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A 
Transplant Take?, UCLA School of Law Working Paper No 02-11, 3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679. 
84.  Id. at 3. 
85.  See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1928–29 (1996) (pointing out that US corporate managers are usually convinced 
that they work for the shareholders). 
86.  Stout, supra note 85, at 34. 
87.  Gilson, supra note 16, at 337–40. 
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PART III: TWO ORIGINAL STYLES OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES REGULATION: 
THE U.K. AND U.S. MODELS 
After exploring both the process and content determinants of the 
convergence observed in corporate protection in the Western world, we now 
move on to the country-level analysis of its development and its transplantation 
across jurisdictions. The corporate opportunities doctrine is said to have 
originated in the common law. However, as this part will show, as in many 
areas of corporate law, there is no single common law model. The U.S. and the 
U.K. employ two different legal strategies, which we survey in subsections A 
and B, respectively. The U.S. doctrine, after a century of development in the 
case law, could be described as the “ownership approach,” since the main 
question courts ask is whether an opportunity “belongs” to the corporation 
because it is one that shareholders would typically expect the corporation to 
pursue. By contrast, the UK strategy could be called the “status approach.” It is 
rooted in the conflict-of-interest paradigm, which has a long tradition in U.K. 
company law and is based on the underlying principle that fiduciaries should 
not be allowed to put themselves in positions of conflict. This model, even if 
questioned by policy-makers and courts in recent decades, was largely affirmed 
in the 2006 Companies Act.88 
A. The U.S. corporate opportunities doctrine: delineating the “ownership 
approach” 
The U.S. approach has developed through case law over the decades and 
has not been codified.89 While the doctrine has antecedents in the 19th 
century,90 the doctrine adopted its familiar contours and solidified in the first 
half of the 20th century. It eventually culminated in a broad conception of 
fairness, as shown by the most recent case considered to be seminal.91  
 
88.  That is, while the company is solvent. See Companies Act 2006, c. 2 (Eng.) §§ 170–81. 
89.  In the U.S., fiduciary duties are assumed to pre-exist in the background common law, and as 
such they are typically left to the courts to develop. Consequently, the corporate opportunity doctrine is 
not codified in Delaware corporate law, but developed over the decades before the courts. True, some 
acts provide that managers or members may not take opportunities of the business entity. E.g., REV. 
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 409(b)(1)(C), (g)(1) (providing that members in a 
member managed LLC and managers in a manager-managed LLC must account to the company and 
hold as a trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived from the appropriation of a LLC 
opportunity). However, even in those cases, business opportunities are not legislatively defined. 
90.  See Kershaw, supra note 6, at 43–47. 
91.  Broz, 673 A.2d at 148. 
3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2018  8:54 PM  
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 15:1, 2018 
112 
1) The development and contours of the corporate opportunities doctrine 
The most famous duty of loyalty case, Meinhard v. Salmon, dealing with a 
joint venture, sweepingly established that a party to a joint venture must share 
an opportunity with her joint adventurer.92 However, Meinhard did not 
establish a particularly clear criterion on what opportunities are captured by this 
obligation. Similarly, in the well-known 1934 corporate opportunities case of 
Irving Trust, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defended a 
principle “that fiduciaries should not be permitted to assume a position in 
which their individual interests might be in conflict with those of the 
corporation” and, in doing so, found that the corporation’s inability to pursue 
an opportunity does not provide a defense for the director taking it.93 
Today, analysts generally understand the corporate opportunities doctrine to 
be more permissive. The focus is on the threshold question: Which 
opportunities “belong” to the corporation?94 Textbooks generally cite three 
tests – 1) the interest or expectancy test, 2) the line-of-business test, and 3) the 
fairness test.95 These tests often, if not typically, operate in conjunction with 
each other. In applying these tests, the court’s focus seems to have shifted from 
more formalistic towards less formalistic definitions, thus expanding the 
application of the doctrine. The oldest and most narrow “interest or expectancy 
test” asks whether a corporation already has established a tentative claim to the 
opportunity.96 
The most famous corporate opportunity case from Delaware, Guth v. Loft97 
is often cited for establishing the “line-of-business test”, which asks whether an 
opportunity relates “to the business the corporation engages in.”98 In Guth, the 
defendant was the director and controlling shareholder of a chain of candy 
stores who was approached by the controlling shareholder of the bankrupt 
Pepsi Cola Corporation. The defendant was offered the majority of shares in a 
new corporation to continue Pepsi’s business and the option to purchase its 
 
92.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). According to the court, the new lease fell into 
Meinhard’s reasonable expectations because it was “an extension and enlargement of the subject–matter 
of the old one.” Id. at 548. However, it is not entire clear why this should be the case, given that the new 
project was considerable more extensive than the original one, which had been entered into for a limited 
time. 
93.  Irving Tr. Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d. Cir. 1934). 
94.  E.g. David Kershaw, supra note 9, at 608 (2005) (comparing US to UK law); In re Digex, 789 
A.2d 1176, 1188 (Del. Ch. 2000) (analyzing to whom an opportunity “belongs”). 
95.  E.g. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 225–29 (1986). 
96.  See Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496 (1900) (a corporation holding 1/3 of 
a stone quarry has an expectancy in purchasing the other shares); Pike’s Peak Co. v. Pfunter, 123 N.W. 
19 (Mich. 1909) (a corporation having leased property has an expectancy to renew it when it is 
available); Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 139 N.W. 839 (Neb. 1913) (a corporation has an expectancy 
to acquire rights to divert a river upstream from its power plants). 
97.  Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
98.  E.g., CLARK, supra note 97, at 227; but see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 384–
85 (2d ed., 2010) (questioning the accuracy of the predominant characterization of the case). 
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recipe. The Supreme Court of Delaware found that the corporation that the 
defendant was a director for “had no interest or expectancy in the Pepsi-Cola 
opportunity,99 but it was (maybe somewhat questionably) within its line of 
business, given its “reasonable needs and aspirations for expansion.”100 
A general reading of the case concludes that the perceived line of business 
was a major factor in determining whether corporate opportunity existed. The 
court also looked at whether the opportunity came to the fiduciary in his 
official or individual capacity, and whether the corporation was financially 
capable of taking it.101 The court addressed the fact that the person who had 
approached the director had probably expected the firm – and not the director – 
to take the opportunity, and that Guth controlled the corporation, thus 
compromising the other directors’ abilities to independently assess the 
situation. Thus, a good argument can be made that the case should be seen as 
an example of a broader “fairness test”,102 where the line of business is just one 
major factor alongside the origin of the information and its relationship to the 
corporate functions of the executive. 
We can see a progression in the case law that revolves – with respect to all 
of these tests – around the question of rational expectations,103 which are the 
opportunities a (minority) shareholder in the corporation can expect the 
company to take. The doctrine starts out with a narrow test based on an existing 
interest or right in the earliest cases, but then swiftly expands to a broader test 
in Guth. While the Delaware court employed a relatively expansive and 
malleable definition of what constitutes a corporate opportunity, and continued 
to use language indicating an “uncompromising rigidity” of the duty, it created 
a “way out” for directors to give them an argument that some opportunities are 
not inherently tied to the corporation. 
The emphasis on rational expectations can be seen also in the ALI 
Principles of Corporate Governance, in which there are two possibilities of an 
opportunity to be considered “corporate.” First, a corporate opportunity exists 
when a director or executive became aware of the opportunity in connection 
with the performance of his functions and was expected to offer the opportunity 
to the corporation, or he became aware of the opportunity through use of 
corporate information and should reasonably have believed it to be of interest 
to the corporation. Second, an opportunity is corporate when the senior 
executive knew that it would be closely related to a business of the 
corporation.104 Even if these tests rest in part on the reasonable belief or 
 
99.  Guth, 5 A.2d. at 514. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at 511. 
102.  GEVURTZ, supra note 100, at 385. 
103.  See Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1010. 
104.  ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05(b) (1994). 
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knowledge of the executive, the decisive question is always whether the 
corporation could reasonably have been expected to take it in the future. 
Recently, the most frequently discussed case is Broz,105 which largely 
follows Guth in its delineation of what qualifies as a corporate opportunity. 
Summarizing the test developed by the Delaware courts in Guth and its 
progeny, the Broz court found that a director is not allowed to take an 
opportunity if: 
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; 
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; 
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and 
(4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be 
placed in a position inamicable to his duties to the corporation.106 
Along with other recent case law, the Broz test rests within a “fairness” 
paradigm that combines the factors of both traditional tests.107 The court 
summarized the subsequent development of the doctrine by emphasizing that 
“[n]o one factor is dispositive and all factors must be taken into account insofar 
as they are applicable. Cases involving a claim of usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity range over a multitude of factual settings. Hard and fast rules are 
not easily crafted to deal with such an array of complex situations.”108 With this 
case law, the determination of what qualifies as a corporate opportunity 
doctrine is treated as an open-ended standard.109 In other words, this is a legal 
duty to which texture is only given in an ex post assessment by the courts. 
Broz, as a widely discussed case restating the corporate opportunity 
doctrine, is also emblematic for its erosion in practice. Within the confines of 
the traditional doctrine, parties have attempted to delineate the scope within 
which directors can take corporate opportunities with the consent of the board, 
thus further hollowing out the doctrine. Broz illustrates practical problems 
resulting from the corporate opportunities doctrine. The defendant was the 
100% owner of a corporation in the cell phone business (RFBC), and served on 
the board of CIS, a competitor. After learning of the opportunity to purchase a 
cell phone license, he took it for RFBC and not CIS. PriCellular, which 
subsequently acquired troubled CIS, sued him and argued that he should have 
prioritized the interests of CIS and PriCellular as its acquiring shareholder. It is 
often difficult to avoid being subject to dual loyalties, especially when there are 
interlocking directorships in a particular industry, and when ownership of firms 
is somewhat fluid. The conflict of interest would have even been more difficult 
 
105.  Broz, 673 A.2d at 148. 
106.  Id. at 155. 
107.  E.g., Talley, supra note 64, at 293 (noting that a small number of jurisdictions have adopted 
the fairness test in the past 25 years). 
108.  Broz, 673 A.2d at 155. 
109.  E.g., Jens C. Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 83 (2013). 
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to resolve if Broz had not been the sole owner of RFBC, but merely RFBC’s 
director and CEO, and thus exposed to second set of fiduciary duties to other 
RFBC shareholders. 
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery on its finding 
that Broz had been required to present the opportunity to the CIS board, since 
he had learned about the opportunity in his role at RFBC and CIS did not have 
the capacity to take the opportunity. The court also further stated that 
submission to the board creates an ex ante safe harbor for a fiduciary that 
would otherwise be potentially faced with an uncertain ex post determination 
by a court as to whether the requirements of the corporate opportunities 
doctrine are met.110 As the court explained, “presentation avoids the possibility 
that an error in the fiduciary’s assessment of the situation will create future 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty.”111 While superficially reaffirming the 
corporate opportunity doctrine as applied in Delaware, Broz thus points toward 
a larger problem in this context – and in fiduciary law in general –the difficulty 
for decision-makers in business life to plan around it. 
2) Corporate opportunities and the rise of waivers 
The difficulties created by the corporate opportunity doctrine were evident 
in Siegman v. TriStar,112 where the Delaware Court of Chancery dealt with, 
among other things, the validity of an amendment to TriStar’s certificate, which 
attempted to eliminate liability of its directors for breaches of fiduciary duty 
under specified circumstances that could be construed as corporate 
opportunities. While the actual issue underlying the case was a merger of 
TriStar’s and Coca-Cola’s entertainment divisions and the ensuing restructuring 
of corporate holdings, a number of its directors were representatives of major 
shareholders, such as Coca-Cola and HBO, corporations that occasionally had 
relating and competing interests with TriStar. In an amendment to the 
certificate, the parties essentially attempted to define those circumstances to not 
fall within the business interests of TriStar, thus creating a carve-out from the 
corporate opportunities doctrine. Vice Chancellor Jacobs, however, expressed 
concern that a Coca-Cola nominee director on the TriStar board could direct an 
opportunity to Coca-Cola. Since DGCL § 102(b)(7) only permits the 
elimination of liability in cases of breaches of the duty of care, the Vice 
Chancellor refused to grant the motion to dismiss.113 
The dot-com era of the late 1990s led to an increasing number of firms with 
overlapping ownership structures, which led to a push for a legislative overhaul 
 
110.  Broz, 673 A.2d at 157. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, 1989 WL 48746, reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 218 (1990). 
113.  Id. at 235–36. 
3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2018  8:54 PM  
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 15:1, 2018 
116 
of Siegman in Delaware.114 This eventually resulted in the enactment of a 
statute in 2000. The law now permits a corporation to “[r]enounce, in its 
certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, any interest or 
expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to 
participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories 
of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or more of 
its officers, directors or stockholders” (DGCL § 122(17)). The objective of the 
reform was to permit “the corporation to determine in advance whether a 
specified business opportunity or class or category of business opportunities is 
a corporate opportunity of the corporation rather than to address such 
opportunities as they arise.”115 Other states have followed the Delaware model 
in recent years and permitted corporate opportunity waivers.116 
While DGCL § 122(17) does not permit the flat-out elimination of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine, the provision is part of a larger pattern that can 
be traced back to the introduction of § 102(b)(7) and continued with the trend 
toward the elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs and other “unincorporated” 
business organizations in the 2000s.117 Critics have denounced the watering 
down of fiduciary duty in the past thirty years118 and the contractual view of 
fiduciary duty as rhetorical ploy.119 Anecdotal evidence and the presence of 
 
114.  Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1093. 
115.  72 Del. Laws 619 (2000) ch. 343 (S.B. 363), section 3; see also Lawrence E. Hamermesh, 
The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1780–81 (2006) 
(noting that Siegman was the cause for the enactment of the statute). 
116.  Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1101–04. 
117.   Under Delaware law for interpreting LLC and LP law, “maximum effect” will be given “to 
the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2017) (regarding LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) 
(2017) (regarding LPs). A 2004 amendment explicitly stated that “[t]o the extent . . . a member or 
manager or other person has [fiduciary duties], [these] may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by 
provisions in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company 
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(c) (2017). For the amending legislation, see DEL. LAWS Ch. 275 (H.B. 411); 
Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 279, 
279 (2009); see also Brent J. Horton, Modifying Fiduciary Duties in Delaware: Observing Ten Years of 
Decisional Law, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921 (2016) (analyzing the effects of the 2004 amendment on the 
case law). On the debate of whether fiduciary duties apply by default under Delaware LLC law, see 
Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 222–23 (2009); LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 176 (2010); Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40 
A.3d 839, 849–56 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, V.C. suggesting that fiduciary duties exist by default); Gatz 
Properties LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218–20 (Del. 2012) (Steele, C.J. criticizing the 
Court of Chancery for even raising the issue); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1104 (2017), as amended by 
2013 DELAWARE LAWS CH. 74 (H.B. 126) (resolving the debate by legislating that “the rules of law and 
equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the law merchant, shall 
govern”). 
118.  Joshua Getzler, Understanding the Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 39, 46 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014). 
119.  Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, id., at 
242, 244–49. 
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significant amount of case law on LLCs suggest that transactional lawyers 
often attempt to eliminate fiduciary duties in closely-held firms.120 Specifically, 
the corporate opportunity doctrine creates particular problems when an 
individual serves on the board of multiple corporations in the same or related 
industries, as seen in the Broz case. Investors increasingly attempt to put 
“constituency directors” on boards to represent their interests. This is especially 
evident in the venture capital industry.121 Courts typically find that such special 
interest directors have the same fiduciary duties as all other corporations.122 
With corporate opportunities conflicting between different firms, a venture 
capitalist firm might find itself in a difficult position as it tries to protect its 
investment in different firms.123 The problem may even lead to a situation 
where a director or venture capitalist inevitably becomes responsible for one of 
two firms, namely the one that does not end up taking to the opportunity. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that corporate opportunity waivers have, in 
fact, become common, presumably for good business reasons.124 In the end, the 
U.S. corporate law doctrine has proven itself sufficiently flexible to address the 
concern of restraining directors from wanting to serve on multiple boards. 
3) The pushback against fiduciary duty and the lifecycle of corporate law 
In light of these developments, we can interpret the development of the 
corporate opportunities doctrine as part of a larger trend. In corporations, it is 
now possible to narrow down and specify which opportunities are protected, 
while in LLCs, it has become possible to eliminate them entirely alongside the 
remainder of the duty of loyalty. 
The question of whether fiduciary duties should be mandatory has been the 
subject to an extensive debate during the past three decades. On one side of the 
debate, contractarians argue that fiduciary duties are intended to fill gaps with 
hypothetical terms that parties would have agreed to had they considered the 
issue and negotiated. Hence, if parties have actually negotiated terms, it is 
counterproductive for the courts to impose additional costs by overriding the 
parties with mandatory fiduciary principles.125 By contrast, the traditional 
 
120.  E.g. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the 
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1609, 1617–18 (2004) (noting that practitioners attempt to limit their client’s exposure to liability 
through contractual arrangements). 
121.  E.g. Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift not the Painted Veil! To Whom are 
Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1072. 
122.  In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. 
July 24, 2009). 
123.  Terence Woolf, The Venture Capitalist’s Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 473, 489–96. 
124.  Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1123–28. 
125.  E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
537, 544–45 (1997). 
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common law view considers fiduciary duty to be rooted in status and not in 
contract. Fiduciary duties thus arise through the fulfillment of objective criteria 
and not consent.126 Traditionalists tend to be concerned that opting out of 
fiduciary duties will open up corporations and LLCs to opportunism by the 
individuals in control.127 
Larry Ribstein, a leading contractarian scholar, aptly argued that fiduciary 
duties should only apply in situations akin to managers in a publicly traded 
corporation, with a strong separation between powerful managers and 
powerless shareholders.128 However, the possibility for the parties to negotiate 
other protections, such as the ex post judicial strategy of fiduciary duty, may 
not always be the most cost-effective, especially when compared to the 
hypothetical bargain of the parties.129 Critics of contractarians have decried the 
economics-inspired watering down of fiduciary duty in the past thirty years130 
and criticized the contractual view of fiduciary duty as rhetorical ploy.131 At a 
minimum, anecdotal evidence and the presence of significant amounts of case 
law on LLCs suggest that transactional lawyers often attempt to eliminate 
fiduciary duties in closely-held firms.132  
In the end, the corporate opportunities doctrine may have reached a stage of 
development where its costs often exceed its benefits, thus creating incentives 
for parties to opt out. This may be the reason why U.S. courts and legislatures 
have shifted away from a strict enforcement over time and broadened the 
possibilities to escape its grasp, both ex ante and ex post. As we will see next, 
U.S. law is distinct from the other jurisdictions in this respect. 
B. The UK’s conflict avoidance doctrine: an ambiguous “status approach” 
In the UK, corporate opportunity law has been ambiguous since its 
inception. A large number of cases have shaped twin applicable principles – the 
“no-conflict” and the “no-profit” principles – without clarifying their respective 
domains.133 The 2006 codification foregrounded the no-conflict rationale but 
 
126.  E.g., James Edelman, Common Callings, Implied Terms, and Lessons for Fiduciary Duties, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 21, 23–27 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014). 
127.  E.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the 
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1609, 1611–12 (2004) (summarizing problems of opportunism). 
128.  Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209. 
129.  Id. at 223. 
130.  Joshua Getzler, Understanding the Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 128, at 39, 46. 
131.  Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 128, at 242, 244–49. 
132.  E.g., Miller, supra note 122 at 1617–18 (noting that practitioners attempt to limit their client’s 
exposure to liability through contractual arrangements). 
133.  See, e.g., Kershaw, supra note 96, at 607–08; Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s 
Conscience – A Justification of a Stringent Profit-stripping Rule, 28 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 763–81 (2008). 
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did not clarify the boundaries of the prohibited conflicts. The level of 
contractual flexibility to restrict fiduciary duties in corporate opportunities law 
remains quite limited.134  
1) The development and contours of the conflict avoidance approach 
As we have seen, U.S. corporate law has developed a pragmatic definition 
of corporate opportunities, with a focus on the impact of the corporation. This 
development has trended toward greater permissiveness. In contrast, UK law is 
based on a codified conflict, where the basis for liability resulted from a period 
of tension between two competing grounds in equity, the “no-profit” and the 
“no-conflict” rule.  
 a) Tension between the “no-profit” and “no-conflict” rules 
Since the 19th century, UK directors have been likened to agents or trustees 
of the company. Therefore, directors have been subject to fiduciary duties and 
equitable principles that more generally shape the corporate opportunities 
problem for persons entrusted with the affairs and assets of others (be they 
trustees, executors, agents, or directors). These principles are stated in cases 
going back to Keech v. Sandford in 1726135 and Bray v. Ford in 1896.136 A 
person in a fiduciary position is neither allowed to make a profit nor put 
himself in a position where his interests and duties conflict.137 
First, directors are required to avoid putting themselves in a position where 
their personal interest, or a duty owed to a third party, would conflict with their 
duty to promote the success of the company. This no-conflict principle was 
powerfully set forth in Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros, a case decided in 1854.138 
In that case, Lord Cranworth enounced that “no one, having [fiduciary] duties 
to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or 
even can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, 
with the interests to whom he is bound to protect.”139 Courts have initially 
based the solutions of director’s liability in business opportunities on this 
rule.140 Cook v. Deeks141 is an early illustration of this approach. Lord 
 
134.  See Christopher M. Bruner, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. 
Business Entities, forthcoming in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW [13] (Andrew Gold & D. 
Gordon Smith eds., 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028798. 
135.  Keech v. Sandford [1726] 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (CA). 
136.  Bray v. Ford [1896] 44 AC (HL). 
137.  See Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty, 84 L.Q. REV. 472, 
472–74 (1968). 
138.  Aberdeen, 1 Macq. Ap. at 461. 
139.  Id. at 471. 
140.  Solutions for self-dealing problems were also historically based on this rule. See Paul Davies 
& Sarah Worthington, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW ¶¶ 16–53, 54 (10th 
ed. 2016). 
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Buckmaster stated that “men who assume the complete control of a company’s 
business must remember that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the interests 
which they are bound to protect, and, while ostensibly acting for the company, 
divert in their own favor business which should properly belong to the 
company they represent.”142 In other words, an opportunity must be reserved to 
the company if exploiting it would create a conflict between the director’s 
interest to benefit from a profitable opportunity and the duty of good faith or 
fidelity (also known as the “duty to promote the success of the company”). 
Later, in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver,143 the no-profit rule governed 
the liability of directors. Here, a director must not make a profit out of property 
acquired by reason of his relationship to the company of which he is a 
fiduciary. In the case, directors had planned to add to their existing movie-
theater business by leasing two other cinemas through a subsidiary. They 
assessed that the company could not afford to capitalize the subsidiary as 
requested by the lessor and decided to enter the capital of the subsidiary and 
increase it themselves. When the directors sold the shares of the parent and the 
subsidiary to a third party as a single business, they made a profit as 
shareholders of the subsidiary. The company shareholders sued the directors for 
a breach of duty and succeeded – although the actual victims were the outside 
shareholders of the company with no standing. The court found the defendant 
liable based on the principle of equity that “those, who by use of a fiduciary 
position make a profit, [are] liable to account for that profit.”144  
Historically, the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule are two principles 
that are universal to the fiduciary doctrine of loyalty.145 They have provided 
twin lines of authority in delineating corporate opportunities law. Strictly 
speaking, the conditions under which each rule is violated are specific.  
Violation of the no-profit rule only occurs when the director uses his fiduciary 
position to exploit the opportunity. Violation of the no-conflict rule occurs 
 
141.  Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC (PC) 554. In this case, three out of the four equal shareholders, 
who were also directors, diverted an opportunity to a new company in which only these three 
shareholders/directors were involved. The three of them agreed thereafter to pass a resolution at a 
shareholders meeting of the four-person company in order to confirm that the latter company had no 
interest in the opportunity. 
142.  Id. at 563. 
143.  Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, [159] (HL). 
144.  Id. at 144. 
145.  ANDREW STAFFORD & STUART RITCHIE, FIDUCIARY DUTIES: DIRECTORS AND EMPLOYEES 
32 (2d ed. 2015). Both rules have characterized the duty of loyalty. For instance, see Lord Herschell’s 
statement in Bray v. Ford, supra note 138: “It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in 
a fiduciary position, such as the plaintiff’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make 
a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not 
appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as 
based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of 
the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus 
prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down 
this positive rule.” 
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when the director’s personal exploitation of the profitable opportunity is 
incompatible with his duty of loyally promote the success of the company.  
However, the discussion in Lord Hodson’s judgment and Lord Upjohn’s 
dissenting opinion in the146 House of Lords case, Boardman v. Phipps147 shows 
that boundaries between the two rules have become blurred. In some cases, 
courts found liability on the basis of elements borrowed from both theories 
when neither would have been an independently sufficient ground for liability. 
For instance, courts have sometimes imposed liability on directors who come 
across an opportunity outside the scope of their employment and did not 
leverage corporate resources for the opportunity (condition for the no-profit 
rule to apply not met). In a well-known case, the Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal even after the company’s board had previously decided (though 
informally) not to acquire further opportunities of this type (which arguably 
eliminate the presence of a conflict of interests).148 
There is, in any case, considerable overlap between the two lines of 
authorities. No-profit cases would usually receive the same solution in a no-
conflict approach. This is not surprising since at a higher level of abstraction, 
the goal of the no-profit rule is arguably safeguarding against the risk that the 
prospect of personal profit will make the director less interested about 
promoting the company’s success when assessing whether to take the 
opportunity. Therefore, the reason for not allowing a director to profit from 
exploiting a corporate opportunity is to avoid a conflict rather than a superficial 
objection to directors making profits in connection with their office.149 Some 
even argue that the profit principle is merely a specific application of the 
conflict principle,150 though there is no doctrinal consensus on this point.151 In 
any event, the no-conflict approach has been the most common basis of the 
 
146.  See Michael Bryan, Boardman v Phipps (1967), in LANDMARK CASES IN EQUITY 581–610 
(Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds., 2012). 
147.  Boardman v. Phipps, sub nom Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL). 
148.  Bhullar v. Bhullar [2003] EWCA (Civ) 424. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, 
¶¶ 16–95. 
149.  DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–88. A scenario in which the no profit rule 
would apply and the no conflict would not operate is when a director receives an opportunity while 
discharging its functions but there is no possible conflict because the opportunity presents no possible 
interest of the company. 
150.  Lord Upjohn famously made this point in Boardman v. Phipps, supra note 149 at 123. 
151.  Matthew Conaglen, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 114–20 (2010). The author remarks on the basis of his extensive review of the 
authorities by recognizing “how difficult it is to determine whether cases were decided on the basis of 
contravention of the conflict principle or of a separate profit principle.” Id. at 116. He then concludes in 
a quasi-Pascalian manner that the profit principle merits to be treated separately as “if the profit 
principle is a wholly contained subset of the conflict principle, one loses nothing except time by 
considering it separately; whereas, if it is not, one runs the risk of reaching faulty conclusions if one 
ignores it and considers only the more clearly established conflict principle.” Id. at 120. 
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solution in more recent common law corporate opportunity cases such as 
Bhullar v. Bhullar152 and O’Donnell v. Shanahan.153  
 b) Prominence of no-conflict rule in the 2006 codification  
The Companies Act 2006 codified the director’s duties and gave 
prominence to the no-conflict approach.154 First, Section 175 is titled ‘Duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest’. Second, its content puts the no-conflict rationale in 
the foreground:  
Section 175 
(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a 
direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests 
of the company.  
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or 
opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the 
property, information or opportunity).  
(. . .) 
(4) This duty is not infringed— (a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as 
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest 
These provisions formally stress the no-conflict requirement. Even the final 
bracket in § 175(2) could be read as a clarification to remove any incentives for 
directors not to do everything they can for their companies, rather than a 
reference to the no-profit rule. Therefore, the legislation reads as an invitation 
to clarify and unify the doctrinal basis on which decisions on corporate 
opportunities are rendered. However, it is too early to tell whether courts will 
accept this invitation as they construct the statute. 
In order to fully appreciate the content of the legislative reform, it is worth 
noting that in its final report leading to the 2006 Companies Act, the Company 
Law Review Steering Group155 indicated a preference for an approach focused 
on the “ownership” of opportunities, which is confusingly often referred to as a 
“corporate opportunities” doctrine and is inspired by U.S. law.156  It suggested 
that the new codified rule should enable courts to first focus on the issue of 
whether the considered opportunity belongs to the company. However, these 
 
152.  Bhullar v. Bhullar [2003] EWCA (Civ) 424. 
153.  In re Allied Bus. and Fin. Consultants Ltd., [2009] 1 BRIT. COMP. LAW CASES 666, sub nom 
O’Donnell v. Shanahan. 
154.  Section 175 of the UK 2006 Companies Act provides that “[a] director of a company must 
avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may 
conflict, with the interests of the company” (§ 175(1)) and that “this applies in particular to the 
exploitation of any property, information or opportunity” (§ 175(2)). Section 175 provides a rule that is 
general for all conflicts of interest but transactions and arrangements with the company (§ 175 (3)), 
which are dealt with by other statutory provisions. 
155.  THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, MODERN COMPANY LAW 
FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY Final Report DTI Pub URN 01/942 and URN 01/943 (June 2001) 3.21–
3.27. 
156.  See Struan Scott, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Impossibility Arguments, 66 MOD. 
L. REV. 852, 867–68 (2003). 
3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2018  8:54 PM  
Opportunity Makes a Thief  
 123 
suggestions were not integrated in the final version of the statute, even though 
the ownership issue has become Section 175’s hidden Achilles heel.  
 c) Construction of the no-conflict statutory requirement  
The 2006 codification does not eliminate all ambiguities since the terms of 
the forbidden conflicts do not appear fully spelt out. The personal interest 
unquestionably consists of the benefit expected from the private exploitation of 
a profitable opportunity. The duty owed to the company is not expressed, but it 
is breached when directors divert some form of property from the company 
(Section 175((2)). Therefore, directors have a duty to protect, including against 
their own personal interest, the assets that belong to the company or should be 
offered to the company first. What turns an opportunity into such an asset? 
What are the contours of opportunities ownership? The statute does not provide 
the criteria for these questions. Instead, guidance must be found in pre-existing 
case law. Decisions refer to many different “connecting factors” including 1) if 
the opportunity is part of the company’s present or potential business activities, 
2) that the director came across the opportunity in the course of discharging the 
duties of the office, 3) that corporate resources were used to develop the 
opportunity, and 4) that the director had been employed to obtain opportunities 
of that sort for the company.157 On the basis of the framing of the issue and of 
the variety of connecting factors referred to, there is a resemblance between 
U.K. and U.S. cases.  
The substantive solutions differ. English law tends to more strictly protect 
the interests of the company and its outside investors while US law tends to 
favor directors.158 U.S. law also tries to assess whether the nature of the 
interested business opportunity is such that, in fairness, its private exploitation 
would even require an authorization.159 
UK courts will often define the company’s interests broadly, using an in 
abstracto approach rather than considering the limits to the company’s ability 
to act. As O’Donnell stressed,160 directors are fiduciaries and are very different 
from partners. “Trustees’ and directors’ fiduciary duties were not so similarly 
circumscribed by the terms of a contract.”161 The extent of the partner’s 
fiduciary duties is determined by the nature of the partnership business and is 
limited by the partnership agreement.162 By contrast, the nature of the director’s 
 
157.  DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–92. 
158.  Kershaw, supra note 96, at 622–24. Stressing the more flexible and undetermined nature of 
the American model, see also David Kershaw, Does It Matter How the Law Thinks About Corporate 
Opportunities?, 25 LEGAL STUD. 533, 541 (2005). 
159.  See above Section III.A.1. 
160.  In re Allied Bus. and Fin. Consultants Ltd., [2009] EWCA (Civ) 751 [824]. 
161.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
162.  See Aas v. Benham, [1891] 2 Ch. 244 (CA). 
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fiduciary duties is unlimited. It is analogous to a general trusteeship. Even in 
circumstances in which it is unlikely that the company will want or be able to 
pursue an opportunity, the opportunity is there for the company to consider and 
potentially reject. The fact that an opportunity is unable to benefit the company, 
for practical or legal reasons, is not a defense to a breach of fiduciary duty.163 
While this is the purpose of the no-conflict rule within the company’s scope of 
business as broadly interpreted, outside that context, this solution might raise 
the fiduciary rule “from pragmatic prophylaxis to something far more 
draconian.”164 In essence, the no-conflict rule aims at ensuring loyalty exists in 
the corporate endeavor. Arguably, such goals implicitly require courts to 
consider the scope of the endeavor. The more abstract approach observed in 
Bhullar or O’Donnell artificially inflates the realm of corporate endeavor and 
prevents the tangibility a possible conflict to be assessed. This uninhibited 
approach raises risks for directors, forced to present very entrepreneurial 
prospects to the board to approve. This also increases the chances of pure 
windfall gains for the company and the shareholders.  
As opposed to the way case law has evolved in the U.S., in the U.K., there 
is little defense for the interested director.165 While, in the earliest cases, the 
U.S. doctrine relied upon a narrow test based on existing interests or right, it 
has since expanded to a broader test based on “rational expectations” in 
Guth,166 and to an even broader assessment based on “fairness” with Broz167 
that leaves a large discretion to ex post assessment by the courts.  
The UK approach reveals a policy decision: the outcome of various debates 
and attempts to balance efficient transactions and conflicts of interest 
theories168 shows a preference for erring on the side of safeguarding the 
director’s duty of loyalty169 rather than giving directors the benefit of the doubt 
and permitting them to engage in entrepreneurial activities,170 as is done in the 
US. Though § 175(4)(a) invites a denial of breach if the situation cannot 
reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest, recent 
cases such as Sharma v. Sharma171 and Pennyfeathers Ltd. v. Pennyfeathers 
 
163.  Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL). 
164.  DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 140, ¶¶ 16–98. 
165.  Knowing that in any case acting in good faith i.e. having honestly formed the view that the 
company’s interest would not be harmed, is not a valid defense either. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, 
supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–88. 
166.  Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
167.  Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). 
168.  See John H. Farrar & Susan Watson, Self-Dealing, Fair Dealing and Related Party 
Transactions – History, Policy and Reform, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 495 (2011). 
169.  Kershaw, supra note 96, at 603. 
170.  John Lowry & Ron Edmunds, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting Boundaries 
of the Duty and its Remedies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 515, 521 (1998). 
171.  Sharma v. Sharma [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1287 reported in [2014] BCC 73, 74, 84–85. It was 
conceded in Sharma that the Petitioner’s conduct in acquiring dental practices for her own benefit would 
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Property Co. Ltd.172 show that common law authorities on the issue of the 
scope of the directors’ duty are still referred to. If this solution is confirmed in 
future cases, the 2006 Companies Act will not have altered the logic of the law 
on this matter.173 Courts will remain in a position to develop the principles of 
fiduciary duty as they generally apply and to favor the integrity of the director’s 
duty of loyalty over the promotion of a more entrepreneurial culture.174  
Courts recognize that the existence and scope of a duty, and therefore 
whether exploitation of a particular opportunity or the withholding of 
information in relation to which the director owes a duty of confidence to a 
third party, depends on the specific circumstances. 175 Typically, having 
multiple capacities creates potential conflicts for directors. Section 175 of the 
2006 Companies Act requires that the additional capacities be disclosed and 
authorized.176 Such authorizations can be regarded as part of the factual matrix 
that permits a delineation of the scope of the fiduciary duty owed to the 
company.177 This means that as a practical matter, venture-capitalists and non-
 
be a breach of the ‘no conflict’ rule and the ‘no profit’ rule since she was a director of a company which 
owned and operated dental practices. The Court referred to the significance of the House of Lords’ 
decision in Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 as being two-fold: “First, it illustrates the strictness 
with which the courts will enforce fiduciary duties, even where, in the absence of a breach of duty, the 
beneficiary would nonetheless have been unable to take advantage of the relevant potential benefit. 
Secondly, it establishes that the beneficiary’s consent does not absolve the fiduciary from liability, 
unless he has disclosed all material facts.” Sharma, EWCA (Civ) 1287, at 43. 
172.  Pennyfeathers Ltd. v. Pennyfeathers Prop. Co. [2013] EWHC 3530 (Ch), 58–63 (referring to 
Sharma, EWCA (Civ) 1287). 
173.  Contra Simon Witney, Corporate Opportunity Law and the Non-Executive Director, 16 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 145, 153 (2016). For recent contributions on the academic debate regarding the scope of 
directors’ duty as to corporate opportunities, see David Gibbs, The Absolute Limit of Directors’ 
Fiduciary Liability for Conflicts of Interest: The Director’s Perspective, 36 COMP. LAW. 231 (2015); 
Sarah Worthington, Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of Equitable 
Formulae, 72(3) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 720 (2013); Shue Sing Churk, Just Abolish the No-Profit Rule, 7 
INT’L CO. & COMM. L. REV. 244 (2015). 
174.  Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, [159] (HL) (“directors, no doubt, are not 
trustees, but they occupy a fiduciary position towards the company whose board they form”). 
175.  Courts do recognize that the existence and scope of a duty, and therefore whether exploitation 
of a particular opportunity or the withholding of information in relation to which the director owes a 
duty of confidence to a third party, depends on the specific circumstances. See Witney, supra note 176, 
at 184 (“in most cases, the court is likely to find that there is no duty to avoid conflicts of interest (or 
indeed any other duty – including, importantly, the duty to promote the success of the company) while a 
director is very clearly acting in that other (fully disclosed and accepted) capacity. Just as it is clear that 
there is no duty upon a director to vote any shares that she holds in the company in accordance with her 
fiduciary duties as a director, because she is acting qua shareholder, so a director who has an 
acknowledged separate capacity outside the company is likely to have no duty to the company, or very 
limited duties, when acting in that capacity. No exemption has been given by the company from the 
duty; it is simply that the law will not impose a duty in those circumstances.”). 
176.  Typically, it is possible for articles of incorporation to acknowledge that directors, and non-
executive directors in particular, have other directorships: articles sometimes permit these other roles, in 
other cases, a director’s approval is required for the potential conflict that may follow. For an empirical 
assessment of the content of articles in relationship with corporate opportunities, see Witney, supra note 
176, at 169. 
177.  Id. 
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executive directors are generally more well-advised to fully disclose outside 
commitments and seek informed consent during their directorship.  
2) Restrictions on fiduciary duties 
The difference between the two jurisdictions is even more pronounced in 
regard to potential restrictions on the requirements of fiduciary duties, either 
via statutory provisions or liability waiver.  
 a) Statutory provisions 
The Companies Act 1929 prohibited provisions in articles of association 
that exempted directors from liability for breach of duty (the equivalent of 
§122(17) of the DGCL). 
Before 1929, there was no impetus to insert protective provisions in articles 
regarding corporate opportunities (in contrast to provisions regarding self-
dealing). The first line of cases that established the director’s liability for 
corporate opportunities usurpation did not inspire provisions enabling board 
approval or removing certain categories of corporate opportunities out of the 
fiduciary regime altogether. 
 b) Ex post or ex ante authorizations 
The basic equitable rule has never been a strict prohibition. A breach of 
fiduciary duty can be approved ex post or ex ante by the beneficiary of the duty, 
e.g., the company. Such approval blocks challenge conflicted transactions and 
relieves the director of any liability. In effect, shareholders have collectively 
been able to authorize the conflicted appropriation since the mid-nineteenth 
century.178 Furthermore, there was little chance that directors would have been 
regarded as the company at that time as the division of powers between the 
shareholders and the directors was only recognized in the early twentieth 
century.179 
In practice, obtaining general meeting sanction of the conflicted transaction 
creates an inconvenience, especially in larger companies, both in ex ante and ex 
post situations. However, boards did not enjoy this power in the United 
Kingdom until the 2006 codification. Boards did not have the power to decide 
not to pursue a particular opportunity and to enable a director to pursue himself 
what was, de facto, no longer a corporate opportunity. The Company Law 
Review successfully recommended that disinterested members of the board 
should be permitted to approve the taking of a corporate opportunity by a 
 
178.  Pursuant to the Company Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, section 90, shareholders could by 
ordinary resolution instruct the directors how they should exercise their management power. 
179.  Such division can be altered by the shareholders via an amendment to the articles, but such 
amendment requires a supermajority vote. 
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director, while no other amendment of the fiduciary rules should be permitted. 
At present, pursuant to the 2006 Companies Act, “[a]ny provision that purports 
to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would 
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.”180 Pursuant to 
Section 175(4)-(6) of the 2006 Companies Act, the board can authorize the 
taking of corporate opportunities, but the director in question and any other 
director having an interest in the opportunity are excluded from voting.181   
How board authorizations can relax the director’s duty in practice requires a 
cautious assessment. First, the board approval rule is only the default rule. 
Board authorization is available in private companies, unless the articles 
exclude it, and in public companies only if the articles authorize it. However, in 
practice, public companies often insert board approval provisions into their 
articles and investors do not oppose such provisions. Second, any authorization 
that is designed to deprive the company of a valuable business opportunity or 
that is not specific enough (a defect that may affect any ex ante authorization) 
is likely to be invalid.182 However, it must be noted that the board is not 
required to obtain any input from a third party before taking its decision. Also, 
in principle, a shareholder would not be able to challenge an approved 
corporate taking on the grounds that the transaction is unfair to the company. In 
contrast to U.S. law, this illustrates the weight English law grants to procedural 
protections over substantive protections. All in all, board approvals are likely to 
be effective. From an economic standpoint, they do facilitate bargaining over 
the allocation of the opportunity to the person who, between the company and 
the director, is best able to exploit it.  
PART IV: GERMANY AND FRANCE AS RECIPIENTS OF THE CORPORATE 
OPPORTUNITIES DOCTRINE AS A LEGAL TRANSPLANT 
As we have seen, U.K. and U.S. courts presently employ a similar 
analytical approach and prohibit directors from usurping opportunities that are 
deemed to be “corporate” on the basis of a multi-factor balancing test. U.S. and 
U.K. Courts however differ as to their general orientations, which can be 
crudely portrayed as pro-management in the U.S. and pro-external investors in 
the U.K.  U.S. law follows a more flexible ownership-centric vision that 
empowers directors to a greater extent, whereas the U.K. approach prioritizes a 
more rigid loyalty requirement that comes with the fiduciary status. The broad 
 
180.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 232(1) (Eng). 
181.  Id. at § 180(4). The general duties of directors, which include the duty to avoid conflicts, only 
have effect “subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give authority, specifically or generally, 
for anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, that would otherwise be a breach of 
duty.” 
182.  DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–68. 
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definition of corporate opportunities in English law is likely subject to the rules 
of almost all situations in which outside shareholders have an interest. Also, in 
cases of non-authorized exploitation of an opportunity, there is little defense in 
England for the interested director, even if, in practical terms, no harm is 
caused to the company.183 Having identified these two different styles within 
common law doctrine, we shall also note that the current English law of 
corporate opportunities has emerged through convoluted case developments, 
with some over-statements as to the prohibitions imposed on directors. The 
2006 legislative intervention clarified the rules that govern corporate 
opportunities. Importantly, it also granted a board the right to approve takings, 
which enabled a more efficient allocation of the opportunity between the board 
and the director.   
We now turn to the civil law world, where France and Germany take 
particularly prominent roles in due to the historic prestige and influence of their 
legal systems. As we will see, the U.S. style of corporate opportunity doctrine 
has largely been adopted in case law in both countries.  In section A, we look at 
Germany, where the adoption of the doctrine can be traced back to several 
decades and the debate proceeds entirely along U.S. lines. Initially, doctrinal 
convergence toward the U.S. model in the courts was only functional and likely 
inadvertent. The influence of legal scholars, a characteristic feature of German 
legal culture, subsequently led to formal convergence as well, turning corporate 
opportunities into a widely recognized doctrinal feature of the director’s duty of 
loyalty. In section B, we look at France, which has followed suit during the past 
few years. The duty of loyalty is still a very new development in France, and 
doctrinal convergence with respect to the corporate opportunity problem has so 
far remained on the functional level, without receiving formal recognition in 
case law by scholars or legislation. 
A. German Geschäftschancenlehre: Common-law-style reasoning in a civil law 
country? 
1) Historical origins in practice and scholarship 
Germany began to develop the corporate opportunity doctrine in the 1960s 
and 1970s. At its foundation, we see two streams of development, namely one 
in the rather intuitive reasoning by the Federal Supreme Court and one in the 
academic analysis of comparative law scholars who looked at the US. By the 
late 1980s, we can identify a confluence of these two streams into a single, 
widely recognized, but less often used doctrine. 
 
183.  Samet, supra note 9, at 765. 
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As a matter of legislation, German law has historically blankly prohibited 
members of the management board of a stock corporation from 1) operating a 
commercial business, 2) engaging in business transactions in the line of 
business of the corporation, and 3) being a member of the supervisory board, 
manager, or personally liable partner in another firm. These activities may 
compete with the corporation and need to be explicitly permitted by the 
supervisory board.184 Separate from this statutory prohibition, German law has 
long recognized that directors and managers were subject to an uncodified duty 
of loyalty. Managers of private limited companies, to which the statute does not 
apply to, are nevertheless assumed to be subject to an analogous prohibition 
because of their general duty of loyalty.185 It is not entirely clear whether the 
prohibition to compete is a specific application of the corporate opportunities 
doctrine, whether corporate opportunities are a specific application of the 
prohibition not to compete, or whether they are separate but overlapping 
prohibitions.186 
The earliest and most frequently cited case for the corporate opportunity 
doctrine dates back to 1967.187 The plaintiff was a manager of a brewery (in the 
form of a GmbH, i.e. Private Limited Company), which was expanding into a 
small town and looking for real estate to purchase. In the course of the 
company’s dealings with the town’s mayor, the manager bought a number of 
lots for himself and re-sold them to a development company at a profit. When 
shareholders subsequently dismissed him from his position, he sued, arguing 
that there had not been sufficient cause to terminate his employment agreement. 
The court found that there was sufficient cause, as the manager had violated his 
duty of loyalty by obtaining a personal advantage as a result of his dealings for 
the firm, while keeping these activities secret from his co-manager and the 
supervisory board. The court stated that the corporation can expect its officers 
to act only for the benefit of the business and not for their personal gain.188 The 
court did not consider it relevant that the mayor had forced the business 
opportunities upon the manager or that the company had not been harmed. The 
result did not rest on a specific statute and the court had not yet developed the 
term “corporate opportunity” or related language at that time. The manager’s 
obligation was seen as a specific manifestation of a general duty of loyalty. 
 
184.  Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act] § 88, https://dejure.org/gesetze/AktG/88.html. 
185.  See, e.g., Klaus-Dieter Stephan & Johannes Tieves, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
GMBHG, § 35, ¶ 86 (Holger Fleischer & Wulf Goette eds., 2012). 
186.  Gerald Spindler in 2 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 88 ¶ 61 (Wulf Goette 
& Mathias Habersack eds., 4th ed. 2014); CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, DER INTERESSENKONFLIKT IM 
DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT 485–86 (2014). 
187.  BGH 8.5.1967, AG 1967, 327 (Ger.). 
188.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
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However, the court interpreted the situation as similar to a prior case where a 
manager had been bribed to enter into a contract on behalf of the company.189 
In a 1977 case, two manager-members of a GmbH (who jointly held the 
majority) set up another entity to purchase some real estate that the company 
needed. The company thus had to rent the land. Citing the previously discussed 
case for the statement that managers must prioritize the corporation’s interest 
over their own, the court found that the two members would only have been 
permitted to buy the land if it was clear that the company did not need it, or the 
members had collectively decided to forego the opportunity.190 As in the 
previous case, the court did not apply an explicit statute.191 It suggested that the 
managers had abused their voting rights (in approving a “discharge” resolution 
concerning themselves), and remanded the case to the lower court for further 
fact-finding.192 
In a 1981 case193, one of the members of a GmbH – who controlled the firm 
together with family members – was going to purchase a controlling stake in a 
competing firm. The articles explicitly prohibited him from doing so, but 
permitted that members could vote to waive the prohibition. Again, the court 
declined to apply a statutory voting prohibition. Therefore, his family members 
were allowed to vote for the waiver. However, the court found that, in general, 
a vote could be considered abusive in specific cases if the corporation itself 
would have been interested in making the purchase.194 The court did not 
explicitly discuss corporate opportunities, and, in contrast to the other two 
cases, did not even mention the duty of loyalty. Instead, it deployed language of 
the (more specific) law of corporate groups. 
At about the same time as the courts were starting to deal with corporate 
opportunities in substance, scholars began to pay attention to the U.S. concept 
of corporate opportunities as a formal doctrine.195 Authors began to develop a 
doctrinal framework for the duty of loyalty in the German context, pointing out 
that U.S. courts would have applied the corporate opportunities doctrine to the 
 
189.  Id.; see Wolfram Timm, Wettbewerbsverbot und „Geschäftschancen”-Lehre im Recht der 
GmbH, 1981 GMBHR 177, 179 (using the term “Schmiergeld” – bribery – to characterize the fact 
pattern). 
190.  BGH 10.2.1977, GmbHR 1977, 129, ¶ 13. 
191.  It also did not refer to § 47 GmbHG, which bars shareholders from voting when subject to 
certain conflicts of interest. 
192.  BGH 10.2.1977, GmbHR 1977, 129, ¶ 21. 
193.  BGH 16.2.1981, BGHZ 80, 69. 
194.  For a summary, see Timm, supra note 191, at 180. 
195.  ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMECKER, VERWALTUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND RECHTE DER 
AKTIONÄRE 166–79 (1958); ULRICH IMMENGA, DIE PERSONALISTISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFT 156–59 
(1970); see also Friedrich Kübler, Erwerbschancen und Organpflichten, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WINFRIED 
WERNER 437, 438 (1984); Holger Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European Company Law – The Case 
of Fiduciary Duties, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 379, 390 (2005) (both noting the importance of 
these authors for the development of the doctrine in Germany). 
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1968 case.196 A number of articles in the early 1980s summarized the German 
case law, issued by a Federal Supreme Court that very likely had no reason to 
take any interest in U.S. doctrine, and drew a roadmap for the application of the 
U.S. doctrine in Germany.197 Thus, corporate opportunities became an 
established topos in German law in the 1980s, and subsequent cases clearly 
refer to the doctrine. For example, in a 1985 case involving a manager who 
registered a patent for himself shortly after leaving a corporation, the court cites 
some of the prior case law discussed above but uses the term Geschäftschance, 
which is the German equivalent of “business opportunity.”198 Similarly, a 1989 
case applied the doctrine to the limited partner whom the general partner had 
asked to negotiate a deal on behalf of the limited partnership.199 
As a new standard component of the duty of loyalty in Germany, corporate 
opportunities found its way into the German Code of Corporate Governance,200 
as well as textbooks and treatises. Writing in 2003, Holger Fleischer was able 
to summarize the doctrine as a prohibition, “which anciently found its way into 
German corporate law through comparative preparatory work and today 
belongs to the core of the duties of conduct for corporate organs.”201 When 
another case reached the Federal Supreme Court in 2012 (specifically in the 
context of a partnership governed by the Civil Code),202 the court found it self-
evident that the prohibition against the appropriation of business opportunities 
is derived from the managing partner’s duty of loyalty and did not require an 
explicit prohibition in the partnership agreement.203 
2) The scope of corporate opportunities and the limited effect of the 
doctrine 
As we can see, German law has at least formally absorbed the U.S. doctrine 
as a legal transplant, even if the absorption process was gradual. To some 
extent, an American observer might even be tempted to say that the courts have 
 
196.  Id. at 267. 
197.  Timm, supra note 192; Kübler, supra note 197, at 439–40, 445–47. 
198.  BGH 23.9.1985, NJW 1986, 585. A decision regarding a partnership that came down the 
same day uses similar terminology. BGH 23.9.1985, NJW 1986, 584. 
199.  BGH 8.5.1989, NJW 1989, 2687. 
200.  GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.3.1; see also GERMAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.5.1 (regarding supervisory board members). For the application of the doctrine 
to the supervisory board as a matter of law, see e.g. GÜNTER H. ROTH & HOLGER ALTMEPPEN, GMBH-
GESETZ § 52, ¶ 32 (7th ed. 2012); Mathias Habersack in 2 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
AKTIENGESETZ, supra note 187, § 116 ¶ 47. 
201.  Holger Fleischer, Gelöste und ungelöste Probleme der gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
Geschäftschancenlehre, 2003 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 985, 985. 
202.  BGH Dec. 12, 2012, DStR 2013, 600. It is not completely clear whether the doctrine would 
apply to non-business partnerships. Between 1989 and 2012, there were only appellate court cases on 
the issue: OLG Frankfurt, May 13, 1997, GmbHR 1998, 376; OLG Celle, Sept. 26, 2001, NZG 2002, 
469; KG May 5, 2001, NZG 2001, 129; OLG München June 10, 2010, BeckRS 2010, 14180. 
203.  BGH Dec. 4, 2012, ¶ 20–21. 
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adopted it by employing common law methods. As we have seen, the courts 
have repeatedly refused to extend the scope of application of bright-line rules – 
specifically the prohibition against directors competing with the company.204 
Instead, it superimposed the corporate opportunity doctrine as a standard 
requiring judicial assessment.205  
However, the German courts have not fully adopted the range of defenses 
and opt-outs that are available in the US. For example, it is not clear if 
shareholders can abrogate the doctrine in the corporate charter.206 In particular, 
liability waivers do not appear to be an issue at all. As to defenses available to 
directors, the sparse case law suggests a more rigid approach than in the US. In 
a 1985 case, the Federal Supreme Court rejected the defense of the 
corporation’s inability to take the opportunity, and even suggested that a 
fiduciary might be required to raise outside capital in order to enable the firm to 
take it.207 The court also rejected the defense that a director had learned of the 
opportunity in a private capacity, suggesting that the duties of care and loyalty 
are indivisible.208 A plausible policy explanation is that a director could easily 
fabricate such an assertion.209 
3) The bottom line: Formal and functional convergence in the case law 
catalyzed by legal scholarship 
Overall, the German case study reveals several factors that are somewhat 
typical of German corporate law: (1) A penchant for judicial lawmaking in the 
form of standards (as opposed to rules); (2) considerable influence of 
scholarship; (3) openness toward foreign influence, particularly from the US, at 
an early stage when U.S. corporate law did not yet have the prestige it enjoys 
today. As to the argument that German law is somewhat stricter than U.S. law 
in permitting fewer defenses,210 we may attribute it to a generally less 
deferential attitude toward directors. One reason may be, as Kershaw suggests 
for the parallel case of the U.K., the absence of regulatory competition in 
corporate law.211 Moreover, in line with our own explanation for the difference 
 
204.  Supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
205.  Supra notes 187–203 and accompanying text. 
206.  For the discussion, see KUMPAN, supra note 187, at 505–06. 
207.  BGH Sept. 23, 1985, II ZR 257/84, NJW 1986, 584, 
208.  BGH Sept. 23, 1985, II ZR 246/85, NJW 1986, 585, 
209.  Holger Fleischer, Gegenwartsfragen der Geschäftschancenlehre im englischen und deutschen 
Gesellschaftsrecht, in INFORMATIK – WIRTSCHAFT – RECHT. REGULIERUNG IN DER 
WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG KILIAN ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 645, 656 (Jürgen 
Taeger & Andreas Wiebe eds., 2005). 
210.  See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech & Edmund Schuster, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ 
DUTY AND LIABILITY PREPARED FOR THE EU COMMISSION DG MARKET 324 (2013). 
211.  Kershaw, supra note 96, at 610–15. 
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between the U.S. and the U.K.,212 it seems possible that German law also has 
remained slightly stricter as enforcement has remained weaker given that there 
are fewer judicial opportunities to further refine the doctrine and mitigate its 
effects.  
Finally, it is possible that the effects of strong enforcement would be felt 
more strongly in Germany given the differences in corporate ownership 
structures. Interestingly, all of the reported German cases appear to involve 
individuals with management capacity. In each, there was a strong case against 
the fiduciary. It is less clear how the courts would assess a situation comparable 
to Broz, where a fiduciary faced a dual loyalty due to his involvement in two 
firms. In fact, given the relatively more concentrated ownership structure and 
more intertwined corporate groups, conflicts of interest of the Broz type should 
emerge quite frequently, even in larger firms. In fact, under the German law of 
corporate groups, public companies (stock corporations) integrated into a de 
facto group may be largely exempt from the corporate opportunities 
doctrine.213  
In the end, we can say that Germany presents a case of both formal and 
functional convergence, although with a twist to the patterns previously 
identified in the literature. German courts and scholars adopted the corporate 
opportunity doctrine as a legal transplant from the United States and integrated 
it into German corporate law. However, as we have seen, German case law 
initially developed by addressing issues that may have posed a corporate 
opportunities problem without labelling the doctrine as such. We could 
characterize this as functional, but not formal, convergence. In the literature, 
Coffee, for example, argued that functional convergence in corporate 
governance does not always necessitate formal convergence.214 Both Gilson 
and Coffee have suggested that functional convergence usually precedes formal 
convergence.215 These authors typically look at large, internationally operating 
corporations that need to compete for capital and suggest merely functional 
convergence as way of circumventing inefficient corporate governance 
 
212.  Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Corporate Opportunities in the US and in the UK: 
How Differences in Enforcement Explain Differences in Substantive Fiduciary Duties, RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Gordon Smith eds., 2017). 
213.  Under the law of corporate groups applicable to stock corporations, a de facto controlling 
(corporate) shareholder may inflict disadvantages on a controlled stock corporation integrated into the 
group provided that the disadvantage is compensated within the current fiscal year.  Both the definition 
of a “disadvantage” and the question how the corporation is compensated (i.e. through new business 
opportunities within the group) leave a lot of space to interpretation. Litigation by minority shareholders 
under corporate group law is rare, probably even non-existent in general. Maybe this explains why the 
case law remains limited to private limited liability companies and limited partnerships. 
214.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects of Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999). 
215.  Id. at 679–80; Gilson, supra note 16, at 336. 
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arrangements.216 Our study of the corporate opportunities doctrine shows that 
similar forces may also often be at play on a micro-level of specific doctrines 
affecting mainly small and medium-sized enterprises. 
With functional convergence tentatively in place, formal convergence 
followed for corporate opportunities in Germany. From the perspective of 
comparative law theory, it is most remarkable that the method of 
transplantation was ultimately a reinterpretation of existing case law by legal 
scholars who were aware of American corporate law doctrines and 
recommended them for German domestic needs. An important caveat is that we 
do not observe convergence by legislation, which a casual observer might 
maybe expect in a civil law jurisdiction (for which there are examples in 
German corporate law217). Comparativists generally ascribe a greater 
significance to legal scholarship in the German legal tradition than in others.218 
Thus, it is not surprising that scholarship also provides a pathway for legal 
transplants, which do not require a foothold in legislation. For a complex body 
of case law such as the U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine, legislation might 
not be the appropriate vehicle for an “export.” Given the role of legal 
scholarship in Germany, adoption through scholarship is likely more 
appropriate. 
B. France: Recent adoption of the corporate opportunity doctrine by a 
latecomer 
1) From unfair competition to duty of loyalty and corporate opportunities 
Our analysis of French law is inherently limited because there are few 
relevant cases in recent decisions: the relevant ones are all analyzed below. 
However, this immature jurisdiction is moving towards recognizing a 
substantial duty of loyalty that the directors owe to the company and—beyond 
the corporate personality—to the shareholders. Neither the Civil Code relating 
to companies nor the Commercial Code expresses any general duty of loyalty 
requirement for directors or officers appointed to represent the company’s 
interest. Additionally, no corporate opportunities doctrine or general fiduciary 
law has been developed in French case law. For a long time, only the rules of 
 
216.  See DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 26, at 176 (discussing how firms whose securities are 
listed on a foreign market need to adopt foreign corporate governance standards). 
217.  A prominent example is the business judgment rule, which, in modified form, was initially 
espoused by the Federal Supreme Court in the ARAG/Garmenbeck case in 1997. BGH Apr. 21, 1997, II 
ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.). Subsequently, the German version of the business judgment rule 
was codified in § 93 AKTG in 2005. See, e.g., Gudula Deipenbrock, The “Business Judgment Rule” and 
the Problem of Hindsight Bias – Observations from a German Perspective, EUR. BUS. L. REV. 197, 203–
04 (2016). 
218.  See generally Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in 
Germany Today, 26 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 627 (2006). 
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competition law set limits on managers to engage in private activities for profit. 
Alongside their activities as agents, managers enjoyed the possibility of 
developing business as principals, as long as they did not divulge corporate 
secrets, recruit the companies’ employees to act for another business, or 
commit other acts of unfair competition and parasitism. Only since the end of 
the 1990s, managers’ private businesses have been subject to stricter scrutiny, 
inaugurating a new period of development that still has not been concluded. 
While competition law rules provided the conceptual framework for the first 
decade, recent cases from the 2010s rely more directly in their reasoning on the 
new, transplanted principle of loyalty. 219 
References to the directors’ “duty of loyalty” as the cornerstone of the 
courts’ reasoning signal a possible convergence of form inspired by the UK’s 
duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty of the directors was first introduced as a 
duty to inform shareholders in the Vilgrain case in 1996.220 The duty was 
narrowly understood as a basis for ruling against directors for hiding specific 
information from individual shareholders who were in the process of selling 
their shares, and who were therefore deprived of an opportunity to achieve a 
better sale. More recently, the duty of loyalty of managers was understood as 
the basis to limit the ability of managers to compete with the company and 
appropriate business the company could do.  
The first interesting case was Kopcio,221 where employees resigned en 
masse and were hired soon after by another corporation, which was founded by 
the general manager of the initial company, Mr. Kopcio. The Court of cassation 
stressed that he owed a “duty of loyalty” towards the initial company as a 
manager. Though the court’s reasoning also referred to unfair competition with 
the initial company, a majority of commentators222 identified—as confirmed by 
later cases223—the duty of loyalty as the true basis for the decision. For a 
 
219.  On these developments, see L Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de l’associé et du 
dirigeant de société, Rev. Sociétés 202 (2012). 
220.  Cass. com. Feb. 27, 1996, 94-11.241, Bull. civ. IV, No. 65 (Fr.), Recueil Dalloz 1996, p. 518, 
obs. P. Malaurie, ibidem p. 342, obs. J. Hallouin, ibid. p. 591, note Jacques. Ghestin, Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit civil 1997, p. 114, obs. J. Mestre, Revue Trimestrielle de droit commercial 1999, 
p. 273, obs. H. Le Nabasque, Bulletin Joly Société 1996, p. 485, note Couret. 
221.  Cass. com., 23 Feb. 1998, 96-12638, Bull. civ. 1998, IV, n°86, Société Pic/Kopcio: JCP 1998, 
IV, n°1864, noted by Yves. Picod D. 1999, 100; Claude Champaud et Didier Danet RTD com. 1998, 
612; Marie-Laure Coquelet REV. SOCIÉTÉS 1998, 546. 
222.  Some authors interpreted the decision as a mere reaffirmation of the solution then in force. On 
the various interpretations, see Karine Grevain-Lemercier, LE DEVOIR DE LOYAUTÉ EN DROIT DES 
SOCIÉTÉS, preface Hervé Le Nabasque (2013). 
223.  Court de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jun. 6, 2001, Bull. civ. 
IV, No. 158  (Fr.), note M. Malaurie-Vignal: “In so deciding, after finding that Mr. Taugeron, manager 
of Taugeron, had breached his duty of loyalty to Graphibus by creating a competing company and that 
Mr. Taugeron had caused prejudice to Graphibus by attracting towards Taugeron various customers of 
Graphibus, which showed that Taugeron had acquired a clientele wrongly diverted by its manager, the 
court of appeal did not draw the legal consequences of its own findings”; see also Court de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Feb. 12, 2002, Bull. civ. IV, No. 32 (Fr.); JCP E 2002, 
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manager, personally engaging in an activity that competes with the activity of 
the company he manages is per se contrary to the duty of loyalty and therefore 
improper.224  
With the Société DL Finance v. Alibiac case in 2011,225 the paradigm 
shifted towards a broader recognition of the consequences of the duty of loyalty 
in French corporate law. In that case, shareholders of a company named Clos 
du Baty sued the executive manager for entering into negotiations with a client 
on behalf of his own, separate company, Chantery, after the first stage of 
building work had already been performed for that client by Clos du Baty. The 
shareholders filed a claim on the basis of breach of loyalty and unfair 
competition. The Supreme Court stated that the manager had a duty of loyalty 
and fidelity towards the corporation that made it unlawful for him to negotiate 
as manager of another company. This decision was the first attempt to directly 
tackle the question of whether a manager can decide to take personally 
advantage of a business opportunity that he heard about while in office. 
The question was further considered in the Besins case, where an executive 
manager appropriated a real opportunity that the shareholders (including the 
executive manager) had considered a development opportunity for a 
corporation they set up to manage a medical clinic.226 Shortly before selling his 
shares, Mr. Besins, a member of the managing committee of that corporation, 
bought the medical clinic’s building. This occurred when Mr. Besins knew that 
the other shareholders wanted to purchase the building and had given a 
mandate to a professional to negotiate the sale in their name. The French Court 
of Cassation227  held that Mr. Besins’ behavior was culpable and disloyal 
towards the shareholders. The Court ruled based on sections of the Commercial 
Code relating to directors’ liability rather than general principles of liability 
enunciated in the Civil Code, which shows the Court’s reluctance to articulate 
broadly applicable solutions. The Court’s reasoning referenced the judge-
 
581, 3, obs. A. Viandier and J. Caussain; REV. SOCIÉTÉS 2002, 702, note Godon; D. 2003, somm. 1032, 
obs. Y. Picod; DR. ET PATRIMOINE mai 2002, 94, note Didier Poracchia) Fails to fulfill its duty of loyalty 
and fidelity to the company it heads “the resigning manager who starts a competing company during the 
notice period imposed by a clause in the articles of association and whose competing company starts to 
operate before the expiry of that period.” 
224.  Jean-Jacques Caussain, A propos du devoir de loyauté des dirigeants de société, in 
MELANGES MERCADAL, 303, 307 (2002). 
225.  Court de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Nov. 15, 2011, Bull. civ. 
IV, No. 10-15.049 (Fr.), note Couret and Dondero; D2012, 134, note Favario; Bull. Joly 2012, <page 
21>, note Le Nabasque, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS 2012, n°2, p. 21, note Roussille; CONTRATS 
CONCURRENCE CONSOMMATION 2012, n°2, p. 39, note obs. M. Malaurie ; GAZ. PAL.2012, n° 41, p. 19, 
note. Saintourens). See also Genevieve Helleringer, Le dirigeant à l’épreuve des opportunité d’affaires, 
Recueil Dalloz 1560 (2012). 
226.  Cass. com., Dec. 18, 2012, n° 11-24.305, Bull. Civ. IV n° 1281, F-P+B, Daury vs. Besins, 
D2013, 288, note Favaro; D2013, 2812, note Gomy; REV. SOCIÉTÉS 213, 362, note Massart; RTD Com 
2013, 90, obs. B. Dondero & P. Le Cannu. 
227.  This is the French court of last resort in commercial and civil matter. 
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enunciated principle that directors have a “duty of loyalty” towards the 
shareholders and the corporation. 
Cases continue to clarify the content of the duty of loyalty, not via careful 
interpretation of a written codified rule, but by the concretization of a standard. 
Consequently, there is room for divergent opinions regarding the content of the 
duty of loyalty. While there is agreement on the existence of a stringent 
information requirement towards the shareholders, some authors limit the duty 
of loyalty to a non-compete obligation, which is only triggered under certain 
factual circumstances.228 On the other hand, others recognize that a more 
extensive principle bans any behavior that may adversely affect the 
company.229 In any case, French law appears to be in the process of expanding 
the duty of loyalty, With the Besins and the DL Finance decisions, the duty of 
loyalty included a broader meaning for the first time: a duty of loyalty towards 
the company.  The language used by the Supreme Court in these cases is 
interestingly both emphatic and uncertain. The Court refers in the 2011 DL 
Finance decision to “a duty of loyalty and fidelity,”230 without the courts ever 
explaining the meaning of either term. Moreover, only one consequence is 
drawn from the breach of both obligations, as if they formed a pair. Authors 
have usually concluded that the “duty of fidelity” has no independent meaning: 
it is mentioned to reinforce the solemnity of the relationship between the 
manager and the company.231 French legal vocabulary does not include 
“fiduciary duties”: based on a common root, the notion of fidelity may be 
understood as conveying the same idea.  
In cases in which managers appropriate themselves an opportunity that 
should arguably have been reserved to the company, the reasoning is very 
much fact-based, which is a relatively uncommon approach in French law. 
Even the French Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court in civil and 
commercial matters232 that only judges legal principles, relies heavily on 
factual assessments of lower courts to reach conclusions in corporate 
opportunity cases, particularly weighing the impact of directors’ behaviors on 
the corporation. Such an approach is characteristic for the application of an 
implicit fairness standard and matches what we have identified as the U.S. 
approach in this matter. Statements by scholars, who refer to U.S. law more 
 
228.  Marc Gomy, D2017, 2445. See also Laurent Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de 
l’associé et du dirigeant de société, at 202. 
229.  See Revue Trimestrielle de droit commercial 2013, 90, obs. B Dondero & P Le Cannu. 
230.  Such a doublet was already used in an earlier decision. Cass. com., Feb. 12, 2002, Darrès c/ 
Société Locam, supra note 223. 
231.  See L Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de l’associé et du dirigeant de société, Rev. 
Sociétés, at 202 (2012). 
232.  Whereas the Court of Cassation is the Supreme Court in civil, commercial and criminal 
matters, the Conseil d’Etat is the highest jurisdiction in administrative and public law, and the Conseil 
Constitutionnel is the highest court in constitutional matters. 
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than the tradition of their English neighbors provide further evidence 
demonstrating the role of U.S. law at a substantive level.233 The preeminence of 
the less stringent U.S. approach is not surprising, since the progress of 
corporate opportunity law shows an increased standard for business ethics and 
an increased recognition of a fiduciary duty, which has been relatively absent in 
the French business and legal culture until recently.234 This expansion 
understandably builds upon established notions in general private law (such as 
property law) and immediately raises the question of the ownership of a 
specific corporate opportunity. 
The solutions expressed in Kopcio, DL Finance, and Besins give some 
indication of the direction of the law’s development, and they provide evidence 
that French law is expanding the duty of loyalty of directors and is on the verge 
of embracing the concept of corporate opportunities. However, the limited 
number of decided cases leaves certain important issues open. In particular, it is 
unclear which opportunities are deemed to be “corporate” opportunities and, as 
such, privileged. There are two criteria found in U.S. and UK law: first, the 
content of the opportunity and how closely it relates to the corporation’s 
activity; secondly, how the opportunity arose.235 DL Finance does refer to 
“negotiating a contract in the same domain of activity,”236 but no guidance is 
offered to interpret this criterion, which might include the existence of direct 
competition. Regarding the origin of the opportunity, Besins mentions that the 
opportunity came to the manager’s knowledge while in office but within a 
cluster of other factual observations, without drawing specific conclusion about 
this specific basis. Other aspects of French corporate law also give some 
guidance, though it is incomplete. For example, opportunities that are identified 
by a director while he is in office are likely to be identified as belonging to the 
corporation.237  
2) Functional, but not formal convergence 
Until quite recently, conflicts of interest were not a topic of concern in 
French business practice and were not subject to any specific legal treatment 
 
233.  See Bruno Dondero, Le traitement juridique des conflits d’intérêts : entre droit commun et 
dispositifs spéciaux, DALLOZ 1686 (2012). 
234.  The contract law of mandate requires a duty of loyalty from the agent. See PHILIPPE 
MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS & PIERE-YVES GAUTIER, LES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX, n°567 (5th ed., 2011). 
235.  See id. 
236.  Cass. com., Nov. 15, 2011, No. 10-15.049, F-P+B, Sté DL finances c/ A, JCP éd. E, 2011, 16, 
note Couret & Dondero. 
237.  Cass. crim., Jan. 12, 2005, No. 04-8399: “Commits an offense of abuse of company’s assets a 
non-salaried manager who deposits in his own name a Soleau envelope concerning an invention which 
was the result of the design and work carried out within the company.” 
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besides self-dealing.238 Even the rules relating to related-party transactions 
were not openly described as a response to potential harm created by conflicts 
of interest. Such transactions have to follow an authorization procedure that 
combines approval of the board (if there is one) and of the shareholders. But 
this procedure only applies to agreements that the interested party declares as 
being unusual or not concluded at arms’ length.239 There are no provisions 
dealing with tunneling more generally,240 but for rules enunciating that 
managers shall be liable if they commit a wrongdoing that causes harm to the 
company, and for criminal sanctions for abuse of corporate assets or votes. 
Liability and criminal sanctions are in practice rarely triggered (unless the 
company has become insolvent), despite the possibility for investors to act ut 
singuli in the name of the harmed company.241  
During the last two decades, a tendency to moralize business practices has 
emerged to meet the conditions required by modern and more globalized 
capitalism. Considerations about the management of conflicts of interests have 
represented an aspect of this development,242 with clear attention being paid to 
corporate governance practices in other countries,243 particularly the United 
States and the United Kingdom.244 The influence of the Anglo-American 
transplant of corporate opportunities law can therefore be traced back to this 
momentum.  
The French case study reveals elements that are emblematic of French 
corporate law: (1) formal expression of general principles after they are 
uncovered by judicial lawmaking; (2) pressure toward the moralization of 
 
238.  Bruno Dondero, Le traitement juridique des conflits d’intérêts: entre droit commun et 
dispositifs spéciaux, DALLOZ 1686 (2012). 
239.  For a critique of the efficacy of the procedure, see Genevieve Helleringer, Related Party 
Transaction. The French Model, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (Luca 
Enriques & Tobias Troeger eds., forthcoming 2018). 
240.  There is no procedure authorizing the private taking of corporate opportunities as in codified 
English company law. 
241.  The fact that class action procedures and contingent fee agreements for lawyers are not 
available might explain for the limited number of actions. 
242.  The 1995 Vienot report marked the realization that foreign professional investors set pressure 
for reform in the way French capitalism operated, particularly in corporate governance. See André Tunc, 
Le rapport Viénot sur le conseil d’administration des sociétés cotées, vol 48, No. 3, 647–55 (1996). 
Though the subject matter of the report was limited to the board of public companies, the message it 
contained touched more broadly on French capitalism. 
243.  The report 1995 Viénot was the product of a working group set up by the two main 
employers’ organizations, AFEP and CNPF (which became MEDEF in Oct. 1998), which was chaired 
by Marc Viénot, then director and executive director of Société Générale Bank. 
244.  The U.S. Principles of Corporate Governance, the UK Cadbury report, and the Greenbury 
report were used as references. See André Tunc, prec. 654–55. The Viénot report included 
recommendations for a director’s behavior guidebook (charte de l’administrateur). It included a 
paragraph on conflicts of interest, requiring the director to disclose them to the board and to abstain from 
voting on matters relating to them. Such a guidebook was later drafted and adopted by the MEDEF and 
AFEP, including the provision on conflict of interest (paragraph 17) that also recommended that 
directors should abstain to enter any conflict of interest. 
3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/25/2018  8:54 PM  
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 15:1, 2018 
140 
business behavior; (3) recognition of foreign influence confined through a so-
called “French conception” of the underlying transplant. The limited case law 
leaves many questions unanswered as to what French law is in relation to 
corporate opportunities. What is certain is that such a doctrine is presently in 
the making. In accordance with classical French legal reasoning, the judge-
made development rests on a rule coined as the “director’s duty of loyalty.” 
The notion of “loyalty” was forcibly introduced into company law (and into 
various other branches)245 less than two decades ago in connection with 
directors’ and managers’ duty toward shareholders.246 It has been the Trojan 
horse paving the way towards the possible recognition of fiduciary duties. Such 
duties could grant the basis for the manager’s liability –and disgorgement 
obligation – in case of tunneling.  
Though the vocabulary “duty of loyalty” is similar to that of UK law and 
suggests formal convergence, the case study showed that, in practice, judges 
tend to consider the ex post situations when assessing the director’s potential 
liability and specifically focus on whether the company suffered harm, which is 
a condition of the manager’s liability under the general provision. This 
approach relies heavily on judicial assessment after the fact. It can be compared 
to the U.S. approach and its standards-based regulatory strategy.247 From this 
perspective, the convergence is essentially functional. Unlike German law, 
French law is not formally converging toward the U.S. model since the courts 
have not yet adopted the concept of corporate opportunities, but French law 
functionally applies the duty of loyalty to equivalent situations. 
PART V: SEARCHING FOR AN EXPLANATION FOR CONVERGENCE 
As we have seen, the United States and the United Kingdom have 
developed two different models for corporate opportunities in light of their very 
different corporate legal environments.248 Albeit in a limited manner, France 
and Germany have both adopted corporate opportunities law.249 While we 
cannot generalize from these two jurisdictions to Continental Europe or the 
Civil Law world generally, it is remarkable that both jurisdictions largely 
follow a pattern set by the United States.250 This leaves three questions to be 
answered. First, since this is likely an example of convergence in corporate 
 
245.  E.g., in procedural law, judges are now allowed to ignore certain written rules pursuant to the 
loyalty principle. See N. Fricero, La loyauté dans le procès civil, Gaz. Pal. 2012, No. 145, p. 27. In the 
performance of contract, loyalty is required, including on behalf of non-professional sellers. Cass. Civ. 
3, Mar. 16, 2011, No. 10-10.503, Mahoudeau c/ Galloux. 
246.  Vocabulary has remained uncertain: “duties” and “obligations” of loyalty may be used in case 
decisions and doctrinal works. 
247.  Supra Section III.A. 
248.  Supra Part III. 
249.  Supra Part IV. 
250.  Id. 
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governance, what forces have pushed these systems towards it? Typically, legal 
transplants require both a good “micro-fit” in the legal infrastructure and a 
good “macro-fit” in the political economy to take root.251 What (if any) 
changes in these areas precipitated the adoption of the concept of corporate 
opportunities? Second, why do we seem to see a trend toward the U.S. model 
and not the UK model, which seems to be more influential in other areas?  
In the following sections, we first explore potential economic consequences 
of corporate opportunities law. We discuss whether the doctrine provides a 
good fit to the French and German corporate governance models (section A). 
Then, we suggest that changes in the past decades have improved that fit 
(section B). Finally, we examine why the American model was still adopted 
based on the development of the French and German corporate governance 
environments (section C). 
From a chronological perspective, it does not appear that the adoption was 
necessarily part of the “neoclassical” wave of convergence in corporate law in 
the 1990s and 2000s. It appears that we can rule out this hypothesis for 
Germany. The original cases have their roots in the 1960s and 1970s. Even 
when they were “retconned” by scholars into the shape of the corporate 
opportunities doctrine,252 convergence in corporate governance was nowhere 
near. It could potentially relate to a longstanding interest in comparative law, 
specifically comparing with U.S. corporate law, which has a long tradition in 
Germany.253 However, we can probably say that the doctrine was reaffirmed 
and strengthened in the more recent period of convergence, for example, in the 
German Corporate Governance Code.254 The purpose of this type of soft law255 
was largely to appeal to Anglo-Saxon institutional investors256 because these 
investors have served as a catalyst for transplanting a common law legal 
concept into civil law jurisdictions. 
In contrast, the local incarnation of the doctrine in France is more recent 
and is in the process of being established because of considerable 
dissatisfaction toward the current standard of business ethics and pressure from 
 
251.  Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 83, at 891. 
252.  Kanda & Milhaupt, supra notes 187–203 and accompanying text. 
253.  E.g., JOHANNES C.D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM NEUEN 
AKTIENRECHT (1934) (providing an early comparison between German and US corporate law, 
specifically the powers of directors and shareholders) ; see also Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in 
the 20th century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205, 
214, 220 (Harwell Wells ed. 2018) (pointing out the attention being given the US and UK law in 
German corporate law reforms during the 1920s and 1930s). 
254.  German Corporate Governance Code, § 4.A.1. 
255.  E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative corporate governance: the state of the art and international 
regulation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 17 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt 
eds., 2013) (characterizing corporate governance codes as “soft law” as they are “not law and lack 
binding force”). 
256.  Wolff, supra note 18, at 132–33. 
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Anglo-Saxon institutional investors.257 Here, in a context where directors are 
more concerned that their behavior might be challenged and their liability 
triggered, a direct influence of the U.S. model seems more plausible.258 
MEDEF and AFEP drafted and adopted a corporate ethics guidebook in 2008. 
This soft law instrument that is still current includes a provision recommending 
that directors abstain from entering any conflict of interest (paragraph 17). 
Obviously, these instruments were inspired by the ALI’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance259 as well as the UK Cadbury and Greenbury reports.260 
A. Integration of the corporate opportunities doctrine in the German or French 
corporate governance environment 
As we previously discussed,261 the corporate opportunity doctrine interacts 
with how production is organized in an economic system. Therefore, it may 
provide a better fit in some systems of economic organization than in others, 
which could have an impact on its transplantation. Legal systems where the 
doctrine creates considerable resistance would likely not be particularly 
receptive to the corporate opportunities doctrine. In other words, the doctrine 
would lack the necessary macro-fit for a successful legal transplant because an 
adverse political economy would trigger considerable resistance. On the one 
hand, this might result in outright political resistance. On the other hand, courts 
often try to find solutions that are not completely at odds with current business 
practice.262 Individuals acting within a legal system that adopts a doctrine from 
abroad—who are socialized in a particular mode of economic organization and 
culture—might be inclined to work with a doctrine in a different way than 
would their counterparts in the legal system of origin. In such a case, the reason 
would be that the imposition of the unmodified doctrine would be seen as too 
burdensome for important constituencies, namely business interests, in the 
 
257.  United States portfolio holdings of foreign securities account for around 12% of market 
capitalization in France. Markus Roth, Labor and Corporate Governance in Times of Pension 
Capitalism, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 778 (2013). 
258.  See Véronique Magnier, Réception du droit américain dans l’organisation interne des 
sociétés commerciales, in L’américanisation du droit, supra note 40, at 213, 219–21. See also Crédit 
Martiniquais, supra note 32. 
259.  On the ALI Principles, see supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
260.  See Véronique Magnier, Les conflits d’intérêts dans les Principes de corporate governance, 
in LES CONFLITS D’INTERETS DANS LE MONDE DES AFFAIRES, UN JANUS A COMBATTRE? 139–54 
(Véronique Magnier ed., 2006). 
261.  Supra Section II.C.1. 
262.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 30, at 156 (suggesting that players in a corporate 
governance system have human capital investment in the currents rules and are therefore unlikely to 
switch); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in Business Law and How Unifying Ends Up in 
New Divergencies, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 27–31 (1998) (discussing how legal doctrine and business 
practice have evolved side by side, which creates a hurdle for legal change); Eva Micheler, English and 
German Securities Law: A Thesis in Doctrinal Path Dependence, 123 L.Q. REV. 251, 255–57 (2007) 
(explaining how law will often not convergence to global norms because of its linkage with local 
business practices). 
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economic and legal system.263 Hence, the doctrine is applied differently than in 
the system of origin, thus resulting in a typical transplant effect. 
Intuitively, one might think that the corporate opportunities doctrine should 
be straightforward and uncontroversial; investors should be more likely to 
invest ex ante if they are protected from fiduciary opportunism ex post. 
Protection of property rights in corporate opportunities thus contributes to a 
stronger base of external financial investment.264 This seems particularly 
important in firms or industries where a high level of specific investment in 
information by the firm is necessary to develop business opportunities, and 
strong enforcement may be necessary to preserve incentives to invest.265 
Investors would likely want to be protected from a fiduciary who is departing 
the firm with innovation worth 10 years of corporate expenditures. However, 
we can observe different levels of enforcement of fiduciary duties generally 
between jurisdictions, and we observe corporate opportunity waivers. Thus, the 
corporate opportunities doctrine must logically present a trade-off, most likely 
because it prohibits certain transactions and inhibits certain business structures. 
Economically speaking, the corporate opportunity doctrine protects 
business innovation. 266 The firm may have researched possible business 
expansion and spent time and money doing so. This may be interpreted as 
“specific investment in intellectual skills that has been carried out by managers 
as a team.” 267 Concurrently, some business innovation will also be carried out 
by team members outside the team at their own time and expense. Ideally, the 
doctrine should delineate these two cases. Of course, courts are not always able 
to differentiate. UK courts tend to define the company’s interest very broadly 
and also tend to strictly protect the outside investors to the detriment of the 
directors.268 Even under the flexible U.S. “fairness” standard, courts might 
sometimes be over-expansive, thus discouraging individual investment in 
business innovation.269 The trade-off inherent in the doctrine lies in the 
discouragement of financial investment in cases with a low level of 
 
263.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, at 157–58; David Charny, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 
in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 293, 297–303 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Mark Roe eds., 2004) (both discussing how distribution of wealth and economic power created by 
existing legal rules creates entrenched interest groups that will oppose changing them). 
264.  Supra Section II.C.1. 
265.  See Corradi, supra note 6, at 776. 
266.  Id. at 776–78 (discussing innovation as “information-specific investment”). 
267.  Id. at 777. 
268.  See above Section III.B. 
269.  A parallel example might be the likely effect of covenants prohibiting workers to compete, 
which arguably have been a competitive disadvantage for Route 128 (Massachusetts) relative to Silicon 
Valley (California) because they made it hard for employees to transfer acquired knowledge to new 
ventures. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, And Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
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enforcement, and in a discouragement of individual investment on business 
innovation in cases with a high level of enforcement. 
To apply this analysis to the convergence debate, we need to analyze the 
impact that a strictly enforced corporate opportunity would have in different 
financial systems, which are often described in the comparative corporate 
governance literature. In particular, the socio-economic “varieties of 
capitalism” theory suggests that different countries have developed different 
packages of socioeconomic and political institutions that have helped the 
respective jurisdictions become competitive by virtue of providing different 
sets of institutional complementarities. While so-called market-based or liberal 
capitalist systems (which include the United States and the UK) rely mainly on 
individual market transactions to coordinate economic activity, coordinated 
capitalist systems (which include France and Germany) operate more strongly 
through coordination between aggregated interest groups, such as unions and 
employer associations relying on collective bargaining.270 Specific human 
capital investment creating a stronger long-term relationship between firms and 
employees is thought to be more important in the latter group, whereas the 
former system is characterized by a mobile labor force.271 
A related—but not entirely identical—literature distinguishes between 
“outside” or “arm’s length” financial systems and “inside” or “control-
oriented” financial systems. Outsider systems serve firms’ financial needs by 
providing deep stock and bond markets, whereas insider systems are 
characterized by bank finance and other large shareholders.272 It is obvious to 
see a connection to the longstanding debate about ownership structures, which 
tends to find that publicly traded firms in the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in the UK, have more dispersed share ownership than their Continental 
European counterparts.273 
If we accept the veracity of these distinctions, we can see that the trade-off 
inherent in the corporate opportunities doctrine will likely have different results 
in different financial systems. In a dispersed ownership system such as that of 
the United States, which relies mainly on external, arm’s length finance, a 
 
270.  On the distinction between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies in the varieties of 
capitalism literature, see Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Richard W. Carney, 
CONTESTED CAPITALISM 3 (2010). 
271.  E.g., id. at 145–47, 154; Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Social 
Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM. 
272.  See generally Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); DIGNAM & GALANIS, 
supra note 26, at 64. 
273.  E.g., Marco Becht & Alisa Roëll, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 43 
EUR. ECON. REV. 1049 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471–517 (1999). 
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strong enforcement of the corporate opportunity doctrine will benefit outside 
finance by dispersed shareholders. Dispersed shareholders at the margins will 
be more likely to invest in the firm because their expectations in the use of 
business opportunities are relatively unlikely to be disappointed. The cost of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine is relatively small, given that their target would 
primarily be managers in control of the firm. In firms with dispersed 
ownership, controlling shareholders are unlikely to be significantly affected by 
the doctrine through their interaction with the firm, given that they are rarely 
involved with business decisions and not necessarily represented in the board 
of directors. As non-controlling shareholders, they would not be subject to a 
fiduciary duty.  
By contrast, in relational finance systems such as that of Germany and 
France, which have significant shareholders and corporate group structures, a 
corporate opportunities doctrine might produce lower benefits and the higher 
costs. Outside investment is less important, which means that defeating 
expectations of outside shareholders is a smaller problem for firms seeking a 
continued ability to attract investment in the stock market. Large shareholders, 
so long as they are not controlling shareholders, will need judicial enforcement 
less frequently, given that they will monitor directors through their delegates on 
the board. Large shareholders may themselves engage in business innovation. 
As significant investors with interlocking board members, they will more likely 
be inhibited in business activities by the doctrine should it end up being 
enforced. A strict judicially enforced corporate opportunity doctrine thus may 
be counterproductive since it would inhibit the creation of corporate groups. 
The reason is that parent corporations may themselves be considered 
fiduciaries, which is why they would be subject to the corporate opportunities 
doctrine and therefore potentially inhibited in their own business innovation. 
For the sake of analytical clarity, we have kept our analysis purely static 
and treated ownership structures and financial systems as exogenous to the 
corporate opportunities doctrine. This may not entirely be true; the presence of 
a corporate opportunity doctrine may, together with other factors and 
enforcement of fiduciary duties in general, push firms marginally more closely 
toward an outside finance system. However, causation could also be reversed; a 
particular ownership structure and financial system may have an impact on the 
legal doctrine, as it shapes the political economy of corporate law, and thus 
adjusts the “macro-fit” of a doctrine considered a legal transplant. Therefore, it 
is probably difficult to speak of the corporate opportunity doctrine as a cause 
for financial structures; rather, we should consider it as a component of the law 
that complements a particular set of economic institutions. In addition, a 
particular set of legal doctrines may have an impact on what industries and 
production structures will thrive in a jurisdiction.  For example, while countries 
following such a model (traditionally European civil law jurisdictions) are often 
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quite successful at capital-intensive incremental product innovation, they 
typically do not excel at small-scale startups (e.g. the IT industry).274 The 
impact of the corporate opportunities doctrine may influence the viability of 
these industries in different degrees. We could hypothesize that, in an industry 
where large scale capital investment is important, a corporate opportunity 
doctrine that inhibits groups with large-scale shareholders might have higher 
costs than benefits. 
B. Enhanced Economic Attractiveness behind a Strong Protection of Corporate 
Opportunities  
We can hypothesize that there are economic reasons why a corporate 
opportunities doctrine and the enforcement of the duty of loyalty, more 
generally, have become more attractive in Germany and France. While, 
generally, shared ownership structures in Continental Europe can still be 
characterized as concentrated, there has been movement towards a more 
dispersed ownership structure. As an important case in point, the fact that 
German banks have famously divested some of their stakes in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s has often been referenced.275 In countries with significant state 
ownership in large firms, there was a trend toward privatization during the 
same period. Concurrently, institutional investors from overseas, such as 
mutual funds and pension funds, have increased their stock ownership in 
Continental Europe. It has been estimated that “US portfolio holdings of 
foreign securities account for 13% of market capitalization of the German stock 
market,” while they account for 12% in France.276 Outside investors are thus 
becoming an important constituency. One could argue that some Continental 
European corporate governance systems are shifting from relational finance 
toward outside finance. The shift is certainly not complete, but it does imply an 
increase in the relative importance of outside investors. In comparison, the 
significance of dealing with the corporation’s “main bank” may have declined, 
as did the significance of group structures for which a strongly enforced 
corporate opportunity doctrine constitutes a hindrance. 
 
274.  E.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 272, at 36–44. 
275.  One reason was apparently the elimination of a capital gains tax for sales of shares between 
corporations, which made it easier for financial institutions to reduce their stakes in industrial 
companies. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 503 (2001); Dariusz Wójcik, Change in the German model of corporate 
governance: evidence from blockholdings 1997-2001, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. 1431, 1435 (2003); DIGNAM & 
GALANIS, supra note 25, at 291; JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER 159–62 (2010); 
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance and 
the Erosion of Deutschland AG, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 518–19 (2015). 
276.  Markus Roth, Labor and Corporate Governance in Times of Pension Capitalism, 18 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 778 (2013). 
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At the same time, this model helps us understand why corporate 
opportunity waivers have become common in the U.S. in recent years.277 While 
the “re-concentration of share ownership” in U.S. firms that commentators have 
observed278 should not significantly impact corporate opportunities, the venture 
capital industry frequently employs corporate opportunity waivers.279 Venture 
capital firms often invest in several businesses and take a controlling stake that 
exposes them to the duty of loyalty. Consequently, they are more likely to run 
afoul of the corporate opportunities doctrine, which, in this context, may turn 
out to be a hindrance to business innovation. 
While this may help explain why the political economy of Continental 
European corporate law became more receptive to the corporate opportunities 
doctrine, it does not explain why the U.S. approach has become more 
influential than the U.K. approach in France and Germany. Moreover, the 
German courts have not adopted some elements from the U.S. approach which 
may have been a good fit to the German corporate governance system, such as 
approval by the board or the defense of incapacity.  
C. Why has the U.S. model been predominantly transplanted into Germany and 
France?  
In both Germany and France, the corporate opportunities doctrine has 
developed under the umbrella of a “duty of loyalty,” while largely following an 
ownership approach. In Germany, tests that closely match the U.S. corporate 
opportunity doctrine have been adopted.280 In France, the vocabulary of the 
duty of loyalty merely introduces analyses centered on the reasonable 
expectations of the corporation and how directors shall not divert from the 
corporation opportunities that should benefit such corporation.281  In France, 
and even more so in Germany, court reasoning based on the duty of loyalty, in 
the context of corporate opportunities, entails a cautious balancing of 
interests—weighing the interests of the corporation against the legitimate 
interests of the directors. While there is no obvious premium to US-origin 
transplant in terms of cultural fit,282 other factors can be suggested to explain 
the hierarchy that benefit US-origin transplants over global competitors such as 
Britain.  
First, in the previous subsections we have speculated that in a relational 
finance system, the benefits of the corporate opportunities doctrine are met by 
 
277.  Supra Section III.A.2. 
278.  Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COL. L. REV. 863, 886–88 (2013). 
279.  Supra Section III.A.2. 
280.  See supra Section IV.A 
281.  See supra Section IV.B. 
282.  See supra Section V.B. 
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greater social costs. Even if the two Continental European jurisdictions have 
absorbed elements of an outside finance system, the cost of the stricter UK 
approach toward corporate opportunities would have been greater than that of 
the U.S. model during the transitional period. 
Second, the judicial nature of the transplant represents the primary reason 
that seems to account for the predominance of the U.S. approach over the U.K. 
approach in that corporate opportunity law has been transplanted from the 
Anglo-American tradition to France and Germany. Judges have been the main 
actors in the adoption and development of corporate opportunities law in these 
two countries. In the absence of legislative text, they have not engaged in 
creative interpretation of a written source, but have rather developed, on the 
basis of a general principle, the duty of loyalty and judgments aiming at a fair 
and balanced solution, taking into account the interests of the corporation and 
of the directors. In these jurisdictions, corporate opportunity law is shaped, 
case-after-case. This organic development leaves judges with the flexibility to 
design and clarify the applicable tests.283 Such an approach is based on the use 
of standards, as in the U.S. model. They give discretion for adjudicators to 
determine, ex post, whether violations have occurred, and to mold corporate 
decisions.284 
It is not surprising that adopting rules is not a very common strategy for 
regulating complex, intra-corporate relations. Such matters can hardly be 
regulated with a mere matrix of prohibitions and exemptions. In addition, 
Continental judges are not in a particularly good position to design such a 
matrix. Comparatively, U.K. judges are in a better position to create the law 
and could rely on the extremely well-developed body of fiduciary law.  
A third reason that may account for the prevalence of the U.S. approach is 
the specific economic and political power of the U.S. and the signaling strategy 
that it invites. U.S. economic power and U.S. economic and corporate law are 
bedfellows. Their ambassadors include institutional investors, lawyers, business 
executives, and multinational enterprises that are financed and advised by 
American investment banks. Economic and political power influence legal 
transfers.285 Borrowing from U.S. corporate law can be expected to show 
institutional investors that the host jurisdictions comply with the U.S. domestic 
legal standards.286 Though the corporate opportunities doctrine transplant has 
been tolerated but not actively initiated by a legislature,287 the economic 
 
283.  As has already been the case in Germany, see above Section IV.A. 
284.  See Armour et al., supra note 57, at 40. 
285.  Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974). 
286.  See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-François Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 164 (2003). 
287.  On this distinction and the importance of passively tolerated transplants in corporate law, see 
Fleischer, supra note 197, at 388. 
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importance of signaling a sound local investor protection has penetrated into 
various levels of actors, so as to become the spirit of the age. Such Zeitgeist 
inspires academics who introduce new foreign ideas into the debate, lawyers 
who write briefs, and judges who, even in civil jurisdictions, are instrumental in 
updating the law in practice.  
A fourth reason that must be stressed is that, compared to English law, U.S. 
corporate law is more attractive among the legal actors who are instrumental in 
the actual corporate law transplant process. Explanations for this power include 
the exemplary reputation of leading U.S. law schools among law firms and the 
reputation for innovation in legal thinking fostered by a strong competition for 
talented students.288 There is a reasonable case for an academic ground 
supporting the success of American legal transplant. Interdisciplinary 
scholarship in areas such as corporate law and economics and law and finance 
largely remains the hallmark of U.S. legal thinking. The legitimacy of U.S. 
law—and therefore transplants originating from the U.S.— also rests in the 
expert interdisciplinary scholarship that accompanies legal solutions. The 
corporate opportunities doctrine has not been analyzed anywhere in as much 
detail as it has been in U.S. academic literature. As a corollary, import of U.S. 
law can also come through the import of economic or financial expertise, or the 
sociology and anthropology of corporations.289 Additionally, the influence 
played by top European students who go to Columbia, Berkeley or Harvard for 
an LL.M. and then return to their home country and develop a successful career 
at the bar, on the bench, or as academics, should not be undermined.290 These 
former students act as agents between the continents. “The role of students 
returning to their home countries after studying abroad has been of central 
importance ever since the invention of universities.”291 The role of Middle 
Ages scholars, educated in Bologna or the Sorbonne, who contributed to the 
circulation of Roman law in Germany is historical evidence of this 
importance.292 
PART VI: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONVERGENCE AND TRANSPLANT DEBATES 
In this part, we discuss larger implications of our investigation for corporate 
governance in comparative law debates. In part, these points overlap, but they 
 
288.  Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institutions: 
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Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001). 
289.  Id. at 251. 
290.  However, it appears that common law countries are overrepresented in top US LL.M. 
programs. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants–Legal Families and the Diffusion of 
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1849–51 (2009). 
291.  David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7, 
24 (David Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001). 
292.  Fleischer, supra note 197, at 391. 
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are relevant for different audiences. While convergence is primarily of interest 
to corporate law scholars, the debate about legal transplants is mainly a concern 
for comparativists. First, we suggest that convergence in corporate governance 
may sometimes be driven by changes in legal doctrine—a mechanism that has 
so far received little attention in the literature (section A). Second, we suggest 
that scholars of comparative law need to broaden their perspective in their 
understanding of legal transplants, and recognize that general concepts are 
easily transplantable because they are adaptable (section B). 
A. Convergence of legal doctrines 
Convergence in corporate governance is usually identified on the level of 
corporate governance practices or on the level of legislation, with the examples 
given in the literature typically falling into these two categories. For example, 
Hansmann and Kraakman look at convergence of corporate governance 
practices on the one hand,293 and legal convergence on the other.294 The 
literature typically focuses on examples that require some form of legislative 
action, (including disclosure requirements, board structure, shareholder 
litigation or the spread of the UK model of takeover law),295 or corporate 
governance codes and reports.296 Other authors have emphasized mechanisms 
requiring conscious firm choice, in particular to avoid inefficient laws.297 
Mathias Siems, in his comprehensive study of convergence in corporate law 
relating to the position of shareholders, emphasizes the primacy of statutory 
law over case law for convergence, noting that “[i]n an area like company law, 
structural problems cannot be tackled, nor legal certainty adequately ensured, 
through case law alone.” Siems also points out that statutes can be transplanted 
more easily.298 
Our case study highlights an alternative pathway toward convergence, 
namely, legal doctrine embedded in the case law. The possibility of legal 
doctrines as a vehicle for convergence has been considered in the literature, but 
 
293.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 454–55; see also Eddy Wymeersch, Convergence 
or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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it has rarely been studied on the micro-level.299 Our analysis leads us to several 
observations for the convergence debate. First, the target jurisdictions we 
studied, France and Germany, are usually considered quintessential civil law 
jurisdictions. An observer from the common law world might be impressed by 
the stereotype about case law not being significant in civil law jurisdictions due 
to the absence of a formal rule of stare decisis. The example of corporate 
opportunities clearly illustrates that case law can be a component of 
convergence if courts absorb foreign doctrinal models and incorporate them 
into their own reasoning. 
Second, our study sheds light on formal and functional convergence and the 
relationship between the two. Both France and Germany provide examples of 
doctrinal convergence on the level of legal doctrine. However, the pathway in 
each case is very different. In Germany, we see gradually developing functional 
convergence in the law that precipitated formal convergence on the level of 
doctrine. In France, we can see only subtle functional convergence so far, 
although formal convergence may actually follow. The catalyst for formal 
convergence in Germany was legal scholarship. Whether doctrinal convergence 
will remain purely functional or also take a formal shape will depend on how 
legal reasoning, generally, occurs in a particular jurisdiction. For the German 
case in point, there were two prerequisites, namely, (1) the strong influence of 
legal scholarship on legal doctrine in German, and (2) the receptivity of 
German scholars to comparison. In France, where scholarship tends to exercise 
less overt influence on the courts, we may not expect to see formal 
convergence. 
Third, we can observe a continued divergence between U.S. and U.K. 
corporate opportunities law, in spite of the shared adherence to the common 
law tradition. At least in the U.K., policymakers and scholars are generally 
receptive to considering U.S. influence, and, in practice, the U.K. came close to 
adopting the U.S. model when the Companies Act of 2006 was being prepared. 
However, it was ultimately rejected, in large part, because a domestic doctrinal 
framework was already in place. This example shows that doctrinal path 
dependence may inhibit convergence in legal doctrine. 
B. The nature and mechanism of transplants 
Our analysis of corporate opportunities also allows us to draw some general 
lessons for the theory of legal transplants. First, we have shown that, even 
today, legal transplants are not necessarily legislative in nature, but can, rather, 
be general concepts (e.g., fiduciary duties), legal doctrine (e.g., corporate 
 
299.  See David Cabrelli & Mathias M. Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in 
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opportunity doctrine), and even their subparts (e.g., “tests” for corporate 
opportunities used in the US). Transplantation through case law may, at first 
glance, appear to be limited; especially since legislatures tend to have more 
extensive law-making powers than courts. However, case law transplants are 
often determinative of changes in legal reasoning, which are gradually 
absorbed by the judges and other actors within the legal system. They may, 
therefore, precipitate larger cultural changes that ultimately result in a 
fundamental transformation of the legal system; which, eventually might chip 
away at the familiar “transplant effect.”  Scholars should, therefore, reconsider 
the traditional, pessimistic view that “the Anglo-American concept of fiduciary 
duty may not be easily transplantable (. . .) to civil law systems.”300 On the 
contrary, the flexible nature of general principles, such as fiduciary duties, 
increases their potential to be incrementally adopted and successfully adapted 
into the host jurisdiction.301 
Second, transplants can be merely formal or substantial, but their effect is 
always the result of an interaction with the local legal culture. A transplant may 
be applied fully or only partially. More precisely, the way the transplant 
occurs—the canals through which imports are made—matter, and impact how 
the transplant operates. In our example, we have observed two different 
transplant routes. One is more theoretical and relies primarily on the dialog of 
scholars (German model). In this case, the medium for the transplant was 
scholarship, and the precise impact is determined by whether scholars are 
receptive to foreign influence or not. As we have seen, the receptivity of 
German scholars has led to an overt parallelism with U.S. doctrinal structures. 
The other mode of transplantation is more practical and relies primarily on the 
dialogue of judges, as seen in the French model. Institutionalized exchanges, 
such as those between supreme courts judges, have facilitated the process. A 
dialogue between scholars and judges also exists, but it is more domestic. If 
judges are constrained in their ability to overtly adopt foreign doctrinal 
structures, they may limit themselves to a functional adoption of a foreign 
doctrine. If judges adopt a doctrine because of a deeply felt need to transition to 
a particular model, the adoption may be more profound and functional, even if 
the existence of a legal transplant is less visible on the surface. 
PART VII: CONCLUSION 
How to handle corporate opportunities, and in particular the interest of a 
director in such opportunity, has been a difficult question in the U.K. and the 
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U.S. for a long time. Though it is a relatively new question in Germany and 
France, it has been similarly identified as a difficult one. Our study has shown a 
considerable degree of convergence: the corporate opportunities doctrine has 
radiated from U.S. law to these two countries. It is an illustration of the 
Americanization of the law that scholars have frequently emphasized.302 The 
U.K., which has the oldest corporate opportunity doctrine, has largely retained 
its own tradition. While we cannot generalize to other Continental European 
civil law jurisdictions, the no-conflict approach has not been received in the 
two jurisdictions we have investigated as a structuring principle. The economic 
macro-fit of the corporate opportunity doctrine may have improved in recent 
decades, in light of changes in these corporate governance systems. Hence, the 
jurisdictions we examined became more receptive to the doctrine, specifically 
its U.S. version, which, apparently, provided a better fit than the U.K. 
equivalent. However, the two jurisdictions differ in significant ways from each 
other, as each of them has absorbed the doctrine in its own fashion. On this 
matter, the dividing line is still between the two common law countries and the 
two civil law countries. This finding underlines the complexity of the legal 
geography. Legal traditions are not blocks that oppose each other but streams 
able to merge, influence one another, and potentially deviate along the various 
dimensions of a given issue. 
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